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UNCERTAINTY AT THE "OUTER BOUNDARIES"
OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
EXTENDING THE ARM OF SCHOOL AUTHORITY
BEYOND THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE INTO
CYBERSPACE
MATTHEW I. SCHIFFHAUER*
INTRODUCTION
In 1979, school officials attempted to shut down an underground student
newspaper, sold off campus, which ridiculed school lunches, cheerleaders,
students and teachers. 1 Today, bullies have taken to the Internet to "mock,
parody and even threaten" other students, teachers and school personnel. 2
For example, recent litigation has concerned matters including: an AOL
Instant Messenger buddy icon that depicted a named teacher being shot,3 a
MySpace parody profile that contained crude answers to questions that
appeared to be by and about a school principal,4 and a message posted on a
social networking website which called on students and their parents to
write a school superintendent in order to "piss her off more."5
As student Internet usage increases, school administrators are exerting
* J.D., June 2009, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., summa cum laude, Political Science,
State University of New York at Buffalo, May 2006.
1 Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1045-46 (2d Cir. 1979).
2 William Glenn, Regulating Student Created Websites: Free Speech in Cyberspace, CONNEXIONS,
May 31, 2007, http://cnx.org/content/m14559/latest/. See Tim Grant, Bullies Take Intimidation to
Cyberspace, PITrSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 26, 2006, at A-l, available at http://www.post-
gazette.com/pg/06177/701250-51 .stm ("Bullies of yesteryear spread ugly rumors and abused their peers
in schoolyards, cafeterias and bus stops. Now some of them are using high technology to inflict pain
and misery through... computers even when their victim is safe at home.").
3 Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating that beneath the picture were
the words "Kill Mr. VanderMolen."), cert. denied, 128 U.S. 1741 (2008)."
4 Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 591 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (indicating that the
profile was sent to many students in the district).
5 Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 202 (D. Conn. 2007), aft'd, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. Conn.
2008).
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more control over student web users. 6 Students around the country have
been punished for their off-campus web postings that have offended school
officials. 7 Indeed, the growing prevalence of Internet use among school
children has presented a unique First Amendment question for public
schools: in what circumstances can school officials "extend their authority
from the schoolhouse gate to students' personal computers"?" 8
The United States Supreme Court has not yet decided a case regarding
the limits of school regulation of off-campus student Internet expression.9
Moreover, the Court's recent school-speech decision in Morse v.
Fredericklo has only added to the uncertainty and left major issues open in
this "premier First Amendment battleground."ll Lower courts have already
disparately interpreted Morse in deciding student Internet speech cases with
6 See Christi Cassel, Keep Out of MySpace!: Protecting Students from Unconstitutional
Suspensions and Expulsions, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 643, 646 (2007) (noting that as student MySpace
usage rises, school officials are "taking matters into their own hands" to discipline students for their
Internet activity); see also Anita Ramasastry, Can Schools Punish Students for Posting Offensive
Content on MySpace and Similar Sites?, FIND LAW, May 1, 2006, http://writ.news.findlaw.con/
ramasastry/20060501.html (stating that the growth of popular social networking websites and blogs
have created disciplinary problems for educators).
7 See Nancy Buczek, Schools Discipline Students over Internet Content: Four at SU Get Probation
for "Extreme" Language Critical of Teaching Assistant, THE POST-STANDARD (Syracuse), Feb. 22,
2006, at Al, available at http://www.thefire.org/index.php/article/6855.html (giving examples of
students from three universities and one high school that were punished for postings on the Internet,
especially social networking sites); see also Jason Cato, Online Snooping Raises Free-Speech
Questions, PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE-REVIEW, Feb. 3, 2006, available at http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/
pittsburghtrib/s_420112.html (reporting that students nationwide are being punished for Internet
expression that school administrators "don't like,"" which is created on "Web sites they don't control,"
and "computers they don't own").
8 See David L. Hudson, Jr., Cyberspeech Overview, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER,
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/speech/studentexpression/topic.aspx?topic=cyberspeech (last
visited Mar. 9, 2008) (noting that the growth of the Internet has "complicated analysis of restrictions on
speech" and, despite uncertain guidelines, some school officials have "extended their authority" by
punishing students for off-campus Internet speech). See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty.
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (announcing that students do not "shed their constitutional rights
to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate").
9 See DAVID L. HUDSON, JR., FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, STUDENT ONLINE EXPRESSION: WHAT
Do THE INTERNET AND MYSPACE MEAN FOR STUDENTS' FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS? 1 (2006),
available at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/PDF/student.internet.speech.pdf ("The U.S. Supreme
Court has never decided a student Internet-speech case."); "See Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards,
Student Speech Rights on Internet Cry Out for Supreme Court Review, L.A. DAILY J., July 24, 2007, at
6, available at http://comm.psu.edu/first/latimesjuly2007.pdf (arguing that the Supreme Court must
hear a case that involves school discipline for a student's off-campus internet use).
10 551 U.S. 393 (2007) (holding a school did not violate the First Amendment by suspending a
student who displayed a banner reading "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" at a school-supervised event because
the school may take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their care from speech considered to
encourage illegal drug use).
II See Hudson, supra note 8 ("[T]his speech-enhancing medium has led to numerous controversies,
causing many people to view the Internet as the premier First Amendment battleground."); see also
Aaron H. Caplan, Public School Discipline for Creating Uncensored Anonymous Internet Forums, 39
WILLAMETTE L REV. 93, 154 (2003) (discussing the tension between schools' need to respond to new
challenges created by the internet and the protection of students' First Amendment rights).
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similar facts. 12 With little judicial guidance, school administrators are left
with the difficult task of deciding when they can discipline students with
regard to Internet expression. This note will argue that, in the absence of
Supreme Court guidance, a new method of implementing the principles set
forth in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District]3 is
required to strike a balance between preserving school safety and
protecting students' constitutional rights in cases involving student Internet
speech.
Part I focuses on the implications of the rise in student Internet usage and
highlights several examples of student Internet activity that have led to
school discipline across the country. Part II examines the traditional
United States Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding when public school
officials may limit a student's right to free expression. Part III analyzes the
disparate application of those traditional standards by lower courts in
Internet-related student speech cases. Part IV suggests that the ad hoc
approach taken by lower courts in determining the proper bounds of school
authority over student Internet speech has failed to strike the appropriate
balance between school authority and students' First Amendment rights.
Part V acknowledges that school authority over student Internet expression
is not unlimited and identifies alternatives to harsh and potentially
unconstitutional punishments. Part VI suggests that a new test is necessary
to evaluate the constitutionality of school discipline based on student
Internet speech. This test employs both prongs of the Tinker standard in
deciding Internet-related student speech cases.
I. THE RISE IN STUDENT INTERNET USAGE AND THE CORRESPONDING
EXTENSION OF THE SCHOOL ARM OF AUTHORITY INTO CYBERSPACE
The Internet is a "speech-enhancing medium"14 that allows people to
"correspond instantaneously at relatively low cost." 15 Indeed, the Internet
has "revolutionized communications and amplified educational
12 Compare Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding that, "as in
Morse," a student was not disciplined for off-campus conduct that was "merely offensive" or "merely in
conflict with some view of the school's educational mission"), with Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist.,
496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 591 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (explaining that "Morse does not permit school officials
unfettered latitude to censor student [Internet] speech under the rubric of interference with the
educational mission because that term can be easily manipulated.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
13 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (holding that student expression may not be suppressed unless it
would "materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school" or "collide with the
rights of others").
14 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 882 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (Dalzell, J., dissenting) (describing the
Internet as a medium "in which citizens from all walks of life have a voice").
15 Hudson, supra note 8.
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opportunities" for students.16 Students are accessing the Internet more
frequently to create their own homepages on social-networking sites, such
as MySpace and or Facebook, and to communicate with others in chat
rooms and with programs like AOL's Instant Messenger.17 However, the
Internet has also become an "instant slam book," in which kids taunt or
insult peers on social-networking sites or via instant messages. 18
Increasing use of the Internet by students has led to monitoring of
student Web activity by school officials.19 Some school administrators
have stretched the boundaries of their traditional authority by punishing
students for online expression even though it occurred off-campus. 20 In
light of the growing violence among students today, schools often claim
that hostilities expressed on the Internet can "result in conflicts that spill
onto the school campus" as a justification for extending the reach of their
authority to students' personal computers. 21
The following are recent examples of incidents involving the Internet
that have led public schools to discipline students. In February 2006, a
student at TeWinkle Middle School in Costa Mesa, California, was
suspended and told that he faced expulsion for allegedly creating a
16 See Hudson, supra note 9, at 1.
17 See Hudson, supra note 8 (explaining that students' frequent use of social-networking sites, like
MySpace and Facebook, complicates analysis of restrictions of speech); see also Ramasastry, supra
note 6 (discussing the growth of student use of social networking sites, such as MySpace and Facebook,
and the popularity of student blogging on the Internet).
18 States Pushing for Laws to Curb Cyberbullying, FOX NEWS, Feb. 21, 2007,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,253259,00.html. See Kelli Kennedy, Not-So-MySpace Any
More, THE LEDGER (Lakeland, Fla.), Apr. 23, 2006, http://www.theledger.comI/apps/pbcs.dll/article?
AID=/20060423/NEWS/604230392/-1/NEWSO1OI ("[B]ullies [have] move[d] from punching someone
on the playground to writing nasty and sometimes libelous postings about classmates, teachers and
school officials on the Internet, where everyone can read them.").
19 See Cassel, supra note 6, at 680 (arguing that "[iun light of heightened student [Internet] activity,
schools have become increasingly involved in monitoring and disciplining students' online social-
networking behavior."); see also Cato, supra note 7 (stating that much "cyber-snooping," is currently
being done by schools rather than parents in order to keep tabs on students' Internet activity).
20 See Hudson, supra note 8, at 1 (asserting that some school administrators have "overreacted" to
student Internet speech, created privately and off campus, by "clamping down on student online
expression with a vice grip"); see also William Bird, Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306
F.3d 616 (8th Cir. 2002), 26 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 111, 127 (2003) (stating that "[a] fast-
growing category of cases involving on campus punishment for arguably off campus expression is that
concerning student speech on the Internet.").
21 Grant, supra note 2. "The Internet just amplifies the speech, so the consequences are far
greater." Id. "Schools sometimes argue that a student's Internet speech should be disciplined because it
adversely affected the educational process within the school." Caplan, supra note 11, at 163". Some
scholars opine that censorship of student expression which school administrators "deem too
controversial or offensive," is an escalating trend in light of numerous school shootings at places like
Columbine High School in Colorado. See David L. Hudson, Jr. & John E. Ferguson, Jr., A First
Amendment Focus: The Courts' Inconsistent Treatment of Bethel v. Fraser and the Curtailment of
Student Rights, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 181, 181 (2002).
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MySpace group 22 titled "I hate [girl's name]," which included an expletive
and a racial reference. 23 Twenty of the student's classmates were also
suspended for merely viewing the post.2 4 A school official explained that
the punishments were justified because the MySpace group caused
concerns about school safety. 25  Apprehensive parents, however,
"questioned whether the school overstepped its bounds by disciplining
students for actions that occurred on personal computers, at home and after
school hours." 26
Five high school students from Belleville, Michigan, were expelled after
school officials saw them brandishing "look alike" weapons and drugs in
MySpace photographs.2 7 Administrators characterized the photos as "gang
activity" and "intimidation" and claimed the expulsions were necessary
because school officials "can't take that chance of something coming onto
campus and people getting hurt." 28 In response, the students' attorney
claimed that school officials failed to see the "changing climate" of what
has become socially acceptable. 29
Preventing controversial Internet expression from spilling over into
school was also a concern in West Lafayette, Indiana, in October 2007,
when West Lafayette school officials punished several students because of
comments posted on a Facebook group created in support of a student who
22 See MySpace, Create or Join MySpace Groups, http://faq.myspace.com/app/answers/detail/a_id
/202 (last visited April 19, 2009) (explaining how to create a group, which then allows the creator to
"add images, post bulletins, invite friends ... [and] change privacy settings"); see also Linda Roeder,
Create a MySpace Group Page, ABOUT.COM, http://personalweb.about.com/od/myspacecom/ss/
grouppage.htm?p=l (last visited Apr. 19, 2009) (providing detailed instructions on how to create a
MySpace group page).
23 Brian Dakss, 20 Youths Suspended in MySpace Case, CBS NEWS, Mar. 3, 2006, http://www.
cbsnews.com/stories/2006/03/03/tech/main1364880.shtml?CMP=llc; Gil Kaufman, Twenty Students
Suspended in Latest Round of MySpace-Related Busts, MTV NEWS, Mar. 3, 2006, http://www.mtv.com/
news/articles/1 525313/20060303/id_0.jhtml.
24 Dakss, supra note 23; Kaufman, supra note 23.
25 Dakss, supra note 23; Kaufman, supra note 23.
26 Dakss, supra note 23.
27 Andrea King, Last Belleville 'MySpace' Student Suspended, J. NEWSPAPERS ONLINE, Dec. 13,
2007, available at http://www.joumalgroup.com/Belleville/6562/last-belleville-myspace-student-
suspended; Karen Bouffard, Columbine Dad Backs Students Expulsions; Parents of Teens Shown on
MySpace with Guns, Drugs Plan to Sue District, DETROIT NEWS, Nov. 13, 2007, at 2B.
28 King, supra note 27. See Marjorie Kauth-Karjala, Belleville Student Banned Again, ANN ARBOR
NEWS, Dec. 12, 2007, available at http://blog.mlive.com/annarbomews/2007/l2/4thstudent in_
myspace case re.html (noting that the race card might have been used by the accused and their
families).
29 See King, supra note 27 (explaining that Sykes's attorney warned the school that it is society's
culture we must be afraid of and not the expelled kids); see also Kauth-Karjala, supra note 28 (stating
that the students' attorney brought up the issue of race before and after the hearings because the
expelled students are all black and the school board's members were all white).
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had been suspended.30 After a fight broke out at the school, a student was
suspended for posting a video of the fight on the Internet site YouTube.31
Several students then started a chat group on Facebook protesting the
administration's actions, which they believed to be unfair. 32 Although none
of the Facebook postings occurred on campus, administrators suspended
the student-protestors under the school's "Student Conduct Code [which]
could be applied whenever students are writing about administrators,
teachers or students online." 33 However, some parents have questioned
similar the punishments and their implications for students' constitutional
rights in similar cases. 34 As one parent stated,"[i]f [the schools would]
spend as much time teaching as they spend telling parents how to parent,
maybe we'd have smarter kids coming out of their schools. '35
These examples are only a few of the many punishments that have
recently been doled out by public school officials for students' off-campus
Internet behavior. Schools have a substantial interest in keeping students
and staff safe and in maintaining the integrity of their educational
environment. Indeed, school safety has become of paramount concern
following tragic shootings at schools across the country, including Virginia
Tech University and Northern Illinois University. However, schools must
30 Indiana High School Student Punished for Calling Administrator an 'Ass' on Facebook,
STUDENT PRESS L. CENTER, Oct. 12, 2007, http://208.106.253.91/newsflash-archives.asp?id=1627&
year=2007 [hereinafter Indiana High School Student Punished] (noting that the student received an in-
school suspension for her comments); Student Suspensions Over Web Comments Spur Debate, INDY
CHANNEL, Oct. 10, 2007, http://www.theindychannel.com/education/14312781/detail.html [hereinafter
Student Suspensions Spur Debate] (stating that suspensions were levied because of the fight and
because of 'Mr. Cassedy's comments directed at the principal).
31 See Indiana High School Student Punished, supra note 30 (reporting that a student was
"punished for posting a video of the altercation online"); see also Student Suspensions Spur Debate,
supra note 30 (discussing the suspensions related to the altercation, and adding that one student was
suspended for posting the fight on YouTube).
32 See Indiana High School Student Punished, supra note 30 (claiming that the "students expressed
anger in their posts that the student who initiated the altercation in the computer lab was not punished");
see also Student Suspensions Spur Debate, supra note 30 (noting that the suspensions motivated
students to form a Facebook group and comment on the "punishment meted out by assistant principal
Ron Shriner").
33 Indiana High School Student Punished, supra note 30. The district's superintendent added that
"the district also scrutinizes off-campus speech if it 'causes a disruption in the educational process."' Id.
"A code of conduct, posted on the school district's Web site, does not directly address postings on the
Internet, but does say existing rules about conduct apply both on and off school grounds." See Student
Suspensions Spur Debate, supra note 30.
34 See Alan Gomez, Students, Officials Locking Horns over Blogs; What is Posted from Home
Brings Punishment at School, USA TODAY, Oct. 26, 2006, at 8D (describing a free-speech debate with
students, their parents, and First Amendment advocates on the side that is worried schools may be
overstepping their bounds by punishing students for Intemet activity done off campus); see also
Editorial, Facebook Smear No Mere 'Prank', CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Dec. 26, 2007, at 8B (discussing
a case in which the parents of students punished for posting insults about a teacher on the Interet hired
lawyers and claimed the punishments violated the students' First Amendment rights).
35 Gomez, supra note 34.
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be mindful of the fact that students have First Amendment rights and the
freedom accorded to Internet expression that occurs off campus and on
one's personal computer is "at its zenith." 36 In order to strike a balance
between preserving school safety and protecting students' constitutional
rights, more concrete guidelines are needed in this "muddled area"37
concerning the punishment of students for their expression on the Internet.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT STANDARDS
REGARDING STUDENT SPEECH
Freedom of speech is a right that is highly valued and essential to the
vitality of our nation's democratic system of government. 38 The First
Amendment to the United States Constitution protects this cherished right
by restricting the Government from "abridging the freedom of speech" of
its citizens. 39 However, an important function of public schools is to
"inculcate [their pupils with] the habits and manners of civility." 40 At
times, student expression may conflict with the values that schools aim to
edify.41 In such situations, schools must balance their interest in value
indoctrination with students' First Amendment rights of free speech and
free expression.42
36 See Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 (2d Cit. 1979). "[Where] school officials have
ventured out of the school yard and into the general community ... the freedom accorded expression is
at its zenith ... ." Id. "The right of public school students to speak freely in public and private places
off-campus should not be limited because they are subject to compulsory attendance laws for part of the
week." Caplan, supra note 11, at 140.
37 See Hudson, supra note 8 (noting that "[tjhe area remains muddled because the Supreme Court
has never addressed a student Internet speech case and has not addressed a pure First Amendment
student speech/press case since 1988."); see also Erin Reeves, Note, The "Scope of a Student": How to
Analyze Student Speech in the Age of the Internet, 42 GA. L. REV. 1127, 1129-30 (2008) (proclaiming
that while the Supreme Court has decided three landmark student speech cases and one seminal Internet
speech case, it has yet to decide a student Internet speech case").
38 See James M. Dedman IV, At Daggers Drawn: The Confederate Flag and the School
Classroom-A Case Study of a Broken First Amendment Formula, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 877, 926 (2001)
(discussing the importance of the First Amendment as a "protection of the expression of unpopular
sentiments from governmental reprisals or censorship."); see also Andrew D.M. Miller, Balancing
School Authority and Student Expression, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 623, 624 (2002) (noting that "freedom of
expression is the 'touchstone of individual liberty and, in turn, democracy'(quoting Stephen C.
Jacques, Comment, Reno v. ACLU: Insulating the Internet, the First Amendment, and the Marketplace
ofIdeas, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1945, 1949 (1997))).
39 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech ... .
40 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986).
41 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 279 (1988) (Brennan, J., Dissenting)
("Free student expression undoubtedly sometimes interferes with the effectiveness of the school's
pedagogical functions."); see also Cassel, supra note 6, at 653 (positing that school value inculcation
"may be at odds" with students' First Amendment rights of free speech and free expression).
42 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681 ("The the undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and
controversial views in schools and classrooms must be balanced against the society's countervailing
interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior."); see also Miller, supra
2010]
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In the seminal case, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District,,43 the United States Supreme Court set the standard for
when a school district may limit a public school student's right to free
expression.44 Although the Tinker Court declared that public school
students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate,"45 there has been much uncertainty as
to the scope of those rights during the forty years following that decision.4 6
The Court created vague exceptions to Tinker's general rule in Bethel
School District No. 403 v. Fraser47 and Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier.48  Moreover, the growth of student Internet use and
corresponding attempts to punish Internet expression by school
administrators has only compounded the ambiguity of the standard.49
Indeed, the Court's most recent school-speech decision, Morse v.
Frederick,50 has further demonstrated why a new uniform method of
implementing Tinker is imperative for resolving Internet-related student
speech cases. 51
note 38, at 653 (emphasizing the importance of striking a compromise "between the schools' interest in
maintaining a safe and educational environment and the students' interest in free expression.").
43 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
44 Id. (holding that a school cannot infringe a student's right to free speech unless that speech
would be materially and substantially disruptive).
45 Id. at 506.
46 See Miller, supra note 38, at 646 (stating that "Tinker and its progeny have left the lower courts
in a state of confusion"); see also Sandy S. Li, The Need for a New, Uniform Standard: The Continued
Threat to Internet-Related Student Speech, 26 LoY. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 65, 67 (2005) (arguing that
disparate interpretations of the Tinker line of cases have left schools and students with very little
guidance when trying to determine what speech is protected).
47 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (stating that it was appropriate for the school to limit the student's
lewd and indecent speech because it would undermine the school's educational mission, and, unlike the
speech in Tinker, this speech lacked a political viewpoint). Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech
Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1027, 1045-46 (2008) (noting the Court was less concerned
with students' free speech as it allowed school officials to censor speech to promote "socially
appropriate behavior" (quoting Fraser, 475 U.S. at 681)").
48 484 U.S. 260, 272-73 (1988) (stating that the Tinker standard does not have to be applied when
determining whether a school may refuse to lend its name and resources to the dissemination of student
expression). See Papandrea, supra note 48, at 1049 (distinguishing Tinker by holding that schools have
broad authority to restrict the "expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public
might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school" (quoting Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at
271)").
49 See Glenn, supra note 2. "[Tlhe seminal cases involving student expression concerned on
campus speech .... This leaves school administrators and courts in the position of extrapolating rules
from case law that do not necessarily apply to off campus [Internet] speech." Id.." "[T]he advent of the
Internet has complicated analysis of restrictions on [student] speech." Hudson, supra note 8.
50 127 U.S. 2618 (2007) (holding that a school can restrict student speech that promotes illegal
drug use in violation of a school policy). See Papandrea, supra note 48, at 1050-51 (noting that the
decision to limit student speech did not arise out of an "abstract desire to avoid controversy," but rather
to limit the danger in promoting illegal drug use (quoting Morse, 127 U.S. at 2629)).
51 See Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 595 (W.D. Pa. 2007) ("The five
separate opinions in Morse illustrate the complexity and diversity of approaches to this evolving area of
[Vol. 24:4
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A. The Tinker Standard - The General Rule
In December 1965, a group of students plotted to convey their objections
to the Vietnam War by wearing black armbands to school.52 When Des
Moines school officials became aware of the plan, they adopted a policy
that any student wearing an armband to school would be asked to remove
it, and if the student refused he would be suspended until he returned
without the armband. 53 Subsequently, three students wore black armbands
to school and were suspended until they agreed to return to school without
wearing them.54
Faced with the question of whether the school's disciplinary actions
violated the students' First Amendment rights, the Court ruled in favor of
the students, stating that "First Amendment rights, applied in light of the
special characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers
and students." 55 Recognizing both the school's need for authority to
prevent disruptions on campus and the students' First Amendment rights,56
the Court established what is now known as the Tinker standard. This
standard provides that school officials may only suppress student
expression if they can reasonably foresee that the expression will
"'materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate
discipline in the operation of the school' . . ." or "collide with the rights of
others." 57  Further, the Court held that "undifferentiated fear or
apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom
of expression."58
The Tinker Court emphasized that students are "" persons under our
Constitution" who are "possessed of fundamental rights which the State
must respect."5 9 Although the Court recognized that the school's action
was based upon the desire to avoid the controversy which might result from
law."); see also Calvert & Richards, supra note 9 (arguing that "Morse did nothing" to resolve the
issues raised when a student is punished for off-campus Internet expression).
52 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).
53 Id. at 504.
54 Id. at 504. The suspended students did not return to school until after the planned period for
wearing armbands had expired. Id.
55 Id. at 506.
56 Id. at 507 ("Our problem lies in the area where students in the exercise of First Amendment
rights collide with the rules of the school authorities.").
57 Id. at 513 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
58 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
59 Id. at 511 (declaring that public schools "may not be enclaves of totalitarianism," and that
"[s]chool officials do not possess absolute authority over their students"). See Hudson, supra note 8, at
8 (describing the Tinker decision as the culmination of the "trend toward greater respect for students'
First Amendment rights").
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expression of opposition to the Vietnam War - a conflict that caused
protest and unrest across the country60 - the Court stated that the "mere
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany
an unpopular viewpoint" is not enough to justify a prohibition on student
expression.6' Further, "[a] student's rights.., do not embrace merely the
classroom hours." 62 Because "intercommunication" among students is an
integral part of the educational process, students may express their
opinions, even on controversial subjects, "in the cafeteria, or on the playing
field, or on the campus during the authorized hours." 63
B. The First Exception to Tinker: The Fraser Standard
In 1986, the Supreme Court carved out the first exception to Tinker in
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser.64 In Fraser, the Court held that
public school officials may prohibit "offensively lewd and indecent
speech" if the speech "undermine[s] the school's basic educational
mission."65 Matthew Fraser, a high school junior, delivered a speech
containing sexual innuendos at a school-sponsored election assembly.66
During Fraser's speech "[s]ome students hooted and yelled" in response,
while others "appeared to be bewildered and embarrassed." 6 7 Although his
speech caused no real disruption,68 Fraser was suspended for three days
under a school disciplinary rule prohibiting the use of obscene language at
60 See Jeff Leen, Washington Comes ofAge; The Vietnam Protests: When Worlds Collided, WASH.
POST, Sept. 27, 1999, at A01A1 (stating that during the Vietnam era the nation endured what was
"perhaps "its greatest turmoil since the Civil War"). See generally Michael Corcoran, Op-Ed., Why
Kent State is Important Today, BOSTON GLOBE, May 4, 2006, at AlI (describing the 1970 shooting of
thirteen students protesting the Vietnam War by National Guardsman at Kent State University as an
example of "what happens when a grossly misguided war divides a country").
61 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
62 Id. at 512.
63 ld. at 512-13.
64 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (holding that a student's free speech rights were not violated when he was
suspended for making a sexually suggestive speech during a school assembly).
65 Id. at 685 (asserting that the School District acted within its "permissible authority" in
disciplining Fraser).
66 Id. at 677-78. The school was holding student elections in order to teach the students about self-
government, and Fraser was giving a speech nominating a fellow student. Id. at 677.
67 Id. at 678. Students were required to either attend the assembly at which Fraser gave his
innuendo laden speech or report to study hall. Id. at 677.
68 See id. at 690 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that the school district failed to show that
Fraser's speech caused a disruption in the school); see also id. at 694-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(positing that although Fraser's sexual innuendo may have been offensive to some listeners, it did not
materially disrupt school activities); Sara Slaff, Silencing Student Speech: Bethel School District No.
403 v. Fraser, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 203, 217-18 (1987) (declaring that the facts of Fraser "do not
demonstrate the requisite material disruption" that would permit a school to restrain student
expression).
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school.69
The Supreme Court identified a "marked distinction" between the
political message in Tinker and the sexual content of the speech in
Fraser.70 It declared that the purpose of the public school system is to
inculcate students with the fundamental values necessary to maintain a
democratic political system.7 1 Departing from Tinker, the Court stated that
the "freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and
classrooms must be balanced against the society's countervailing interest in
teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior." 72
Schools may determine that such fundamental values "cannot be conveyed
in a school that tolerates lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and
conduct." 73 Thus, "[t]he determination of what manner of speech in the
classroom or in [a] school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the
school board." 74
C. The Second Exception to Tinker: The Kuhlmeier Standard
The United States Supreme Court further limited the Tinker decision in
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.75 In that case, the principal of
Hazelwood East High School removed two pages of student-written
articles, two of which regarded regarding pregnancy and divorce, from the
school newspaper, which was published as part of the school's journalism
class.7 6 The principal claimed he was concerned about protecting the
pregnant students' identities and the lack of opportunity for parents
69 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 678-79. Fraser took the opportunity to appeal his punishment, which
also included his removal from the list of students eligible to speak at graduation, but the hearing officer
upheld the disciplinary measures. Id. at 679.
70 Id. at 680 (contrasting the armband in Tinker, which the Court considered "a form of protest or
the expression of a political position," with the "lewd and obscene speech" used by Fraser to make what
he "considered to be a point").
71 Id. at 681. "[W]e echoed the essence of this statement of the objectives of public education as
the '(inculcation of] fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political
system."' Id (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979)). "[T]hese 'fundamental values'
must also take into account consideration of . . . the sensibilities of fellow students." Id. (quoting
Ambach, 441 U.S. at 77).
72 Id.
73 Id. at 683 (holding that the schools, "as instruments of the state," may decide that the teaching of
civility and mature conduct is undermined by the use of such coarse language).
74 Id. (stating that "[n]othing in the Constitution prohibits the states from insisting that certain
modes of expression are inappropriate and subject to sanctions.").
75 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (holding that the high school paper, published by students in class, did not
constitute a public forum, so school officials could reserve the right to reasonably restrict the student's
speech in the paper).
76 Id. at 264. One of the stories described three unidentified Hazelwood East students' experiences
with pregnancy; the other discussed the impact of divorce on named students at the school. Id. at 263.
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mentioned in the divorce story to respond to the remarks. 77 Former
students, who had been staff members on the newspaper, sued the school
district for violating their First Amendment rights. 78
In Kuhlmeier the Court ruled in favor of the school district, declaring
that the First Amendment does not "require a school affirmatively to
promote particular student speech." 79 The Court noted that the Tinker
standard does not determine "when a school may refuse to lend its name
and resources to the dissemination of student expression." 80 Instead, Justice
White, writing for the Court, articulated the Hazelwood standard for
school-sponsored speech: "[e]ducators do not offend the First Amendment
by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech
in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." 81
D. Morse - The "High Court" Issues Esoteric Precedent in "Bong Hits 4
Jesus" Case
In 2007, nearly twenty years after Fraser, the Supreme Court again
addressed a student free-expression case in its fractured decision in Morse
v. Frederick.82 In January, 2002, "the Olympic Torch Relay passed through
Juneau, Alaska, on its way to the winter games in Salt Lake City, Utah."83
While school was in session, the torchbearers were to proceed along the a
street in front of the high school attended by Joseph Frederick.84 The
school's principal allowed students and staff to leave class to observe the
relay "as an approved social event or class trip." 85 Frederick watched the
77 Id. at 263. "[The principal] also believed that the [student pregnancy] article's references to
sexual activity and birth control were inappropriate for some of the younger students at the school." Id.
78 Id. at 262 (noting the former staff members' contention that their First Amendment rights were
violated when school officials deleted two pages of articles from the student paper).
79 See id. at 270-71 (stating that the question addressed in Tinker, whether the First Amendment
requires a school to "tolerate particular student speech," is distinct from the question posed in
Kuhimeier) (emphasis added).
80 Id. at 272-73. In distinguishing Tinker, the Court granted school officials broad authority over
"school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students,
parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school." Id.
at 271.
81 Id. at 273.
82 127 U.S. 2618 (2007). In Morse, Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito joined; Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion;
Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kennedy joined; Justice Breyer filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part; Justice Stevens filed a dissenting
opinion, in which Justices Souter and Ginsburg joined. Id. at 2621.
83 Id. at 2622.
84 Id.
85 Id.. Students were allowed to observe the relay from either side of the street and school officials
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event from across the street and, as the torchbearers and camera crews
passed by, Frederick and his group of friends unfurled a 14-foot banner
bearing the phrase: "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS."86 The principal confiscated
the banner and suspended Frederick for ten days.87
Frederick brought suit alleging that the school board had violated his
First Amendment rights.88 The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the school, finding that the principal "reasonably interpreted the
banner as promoting illegal drug use," which gave her the "authority, if not
the obligation, to stop such messages at a school-sanctioned activity." 89
However, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied the Tinker
standard and reversed. 90
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment, holding
that school officials have the authority to "restrict student speech at a
school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal
drug use." 91 Recognizing that "[t]here is some uncertainty at the outer
boundaries as to when courts should apply school-speech precedents," the
Court quickly dispensed with Frederick's argument that this was not a
school speech case. 92 However, the Court also determined that none of its
prior student speech cases were controlling. 93
In an ad hoc manner, the Court drew on various principles from its
earlier school speech cases to find that "deterring drug use by
were responsible for monitoring the students' actions during the event. Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. On administrative appeal, Frederick's suspension was reduced to eight days, but the school
district's superintendent concluded that the principal's actions were permissible under Fraser because
Frederick's banner was "speech or action that intrudes upon the work of the schools." Id. at 2623
(quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 680). Specifically, the superintendent determined
that the banner "appeared to advocate the use of illegal drugs" and, therefore, it was "inconsistent with
the school's educational mission to educate students about the dangers of illegal drugs and to
discourage their use." Id.
88 Id. (stating that, in his suit, Frederick sought "declaratory and injunctive relief, unspecified
compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees").
89 Id. at 2623.
90 See id. ("[T]he [Ninth Circuit] . . . found a violation of Frederick's First Amendment rights
because the school punished Frederick without demonstrating that his speech gave rise to a risk of
substantial disruption.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
91 Id. at 2625.
92 Id. at 2624. The Court agreed with the district superintendent "that "Frederick cannot stand the
midst of his fellow students, during school hours, at a school-sanctioned activity and claim he is not at
school." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
93 See id. at 2625-29. Kuhlmeier did not control because "no one would reasonably believe that
Frederick's banner bore the school's imprimatur." Id. at 2627. Unlike the armbands in Tinker,
Frederick's banner did not convey any sort of political or religious message. Id. at 2625. In fact, the
Court noted that Morse was "plainly not a case about political debate over the criminalization of drug
use or possession." Id. Further, Fraser did not control because the school officials' "concern [in Morse
was] not that Frederick's speech was offensive, but that it was reasonably viewed as promoting illegal
drug use." Id. at 2629.
ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY
schoolchildren is an 'important and ... perhaps compelling 'interest" of
school officials.94 The Court stated that Fraser's holding demonstrates that
"the constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings." 95 However, the
Court was careful to note that Frederick's speech was not proscribable
under Fraser merely because it was "plainly offensive." 96 Moreover, as
Kuhlmeier and Fraser demonstrate, Tinker is not the sole basis for
restricting student speech. 97 Finally, the Court applied the "special
characteristics of the school environment" language of Tinker and found
that preventing student drug abuse "extends well beyond an abstract desire
to avoid controversy." 98
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens stated that "it is one thing to
restrict speech that advocates drug use[, but] another thing entirely to
prohibit an obscure message with a drug theme." 99 Justice Stevens argued
that prohibiting speech because it supposedly advocates illegal drug use,
unless it is likely to provoke the harm sought to be avoided by the
government, violates the First Amendment because it impermissibly
discriminates based upon content.100 Further, Stevens stated that even if the
school had a compelling interest to prohibit such speech, Frederick's
banner was so vague that a reasonable person could not assume that it
advocated illegal drug use.101 Finally, Justice Stevens took issue with the
majority's deference to the school principal's "ostensibly reasonable
judgment" that "Frederick's sign qualified as drug advocacy."10 2
According to Stevens, this "would permit a listener's perceptions to
determine which speech deserve[s] constitutional protection." 103
94 Id. at 2627-2826 (quoting Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995)).
95 Id. at 2646 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)).
96 See id. at 2629 (noting that if this was deemed plainly offensive "[it would] stretch Fraser too
far; that case should not be read to encompass any speech that could fit under some definition of
,offensive"').
97 Id. at 2627 (stating that "the mode of analysis set forth in Tinker is not absolute").
98 Id. at 2629 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
99 Id. at 2646 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
100 Id. at 26442645-47. "[Jlust as we insisted in Tinker that the school establish some likely
connection between the armbands and their feared consequences, so too [the school here] must show
that Frederick's supposed advocacy stands a meaningfil chance of making otherwise-abstemious
students try marijuana." Id. at 2647.
101 See id. at 2643 (finding that "the school's interest in protecting its students from exposure to
speech 'reasonably regarded as promoting illegal drug use' cannot justify disciplining Frederick for his
attempt to make an ambiguous statement to a television audience simply because it contained an
oblique reference to drugs.") (citation omitted); see also id. (remarking that the majority held otherwise
"after laboring to establish two uncontroversial propositions.").
102 Id. at 2647.
103 Id. at 2647-48. See id. at 2648 (stating that it "would 'pu[t] the speaker in ... circumstances
wholly at the mercy of the varied understanding of his hearers and consequently of whatever inference
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Prior to Morse, courts and school officials were unable to apply the
standards of Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhimeier consistently.104 It appears that
Morse is merely another decision in this line of misguided "ad hoc
exceptions" to the central premise of Tinker.105 After Morse, the
boundaries of school authority and the extent of students' free speech rights
have delved further into a state of uncertainty.106 Although Justice Alito's
concurring opinion purports to limit the breadth of Morse to the context of
non-political, pro-drug student speech,107 this is no guarantee that Morse
will not be interpreted broadly in the future to further cut away at students'
First Amendment rights. 108
Regardless, the Supreme Court has now set forth four different standards
for student speech cases. The interpretation of this new Tinker quartet is
vital to how lower courts will decide future student Internet speech cases.
may be drawn as to his intent and meaning'). "
104 See Hudson & Ferguson, supra note 21, at 208 (positing that "[liower courts apply the trilogy
of Tinker, Fraser and [Kuhlmeier] randomly, selectively siphoning passages to fit desired ends")
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Miller, supra note 38, at 646 (noting that the rules espoused
in the Tinker trilogy have become "nebulous and unpredictable" and that Fraser and Kuhlmeier have
been "vigorously stretched" to allow pervasive regulation of student expression under their "more
lenient standards").
105 Morse 127 U.S. at 2636 (Thomas, J., concurring). See id. (observing that "[t]his doctrine of
exceptions creates confusion without fixing the underlying problem .... ).
106 See Douglas Lee, Lower Court Takes Narrow View of 'Bong Hits' Ruling, FIRST AMENDMENT
CENTER, July 18, 2007, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/commentary.aspx?id=18814 (stating that
efforts to interpret the ramifications of the Morse decision have already begun, but it may not threaten
student rights as much as some had feared); see also Martin A. Schwartz, Supreme Court Restricts
Student Speech, N.Y. LAW J. 3 (2007) (finding that Morse "does not articulate a standard of judicial
review.... leav[ing] lower courts, litigants and their attorneys without guidance for evaluating claims
not on 'all four' with any of the Court's student speech precedents.").
107 See Morse, 127 U.S. at 2637 (Alito, J., concurring) (stating that he "join[s] the opinion of the
Court on the understanding that the opinion does not hold that the special characteristics of the public
schools necessarily justify any other speech restrictions."); see also Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist.,
496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 599 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (finding that "Alito's concurrence in Morse clarifies that
Morse does not permit school officials unfettered latitude to censor student speech"). See generally
Calvert & Richards, supra note 9 (arguing that the Morse concurrence of Justices Alito and Kennedy
"confines the majority's opinion").
108 Morse, 127 U.S. at 2639 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Indeed, the dissenters in Morse recognized this danger. In his dissent, Justice Breyer argued that "while
the holding is theoretically limited to speech promoting the use of illegal drugs, it could in fact
authorize further viewpoint-based restrictions." Id. (emphasis added). Even more skeptical of the Morse
majority's reasoning was Justice Stevens, who posed the question: "Under the Court's reasoning, must
the First Amendment give way whenever a school seeks to punish a student for any speech mentioning
beer, or indeed anything else that might be deemed risky to teenagers?" In response to his own question,
Justice Stevens stated that the "breathtaking sweep" of the Morse opinion suggests that the Court would
support punishing a student for unfurling a "WINE SiPS 4 JESUS" banner. Id. at 2650 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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III. DISPARATE APPLICATION OF STANDARDS IN INTERNET-RELATED
STUDENT SPEECH CASES
In the absence of Supreme Court guidance, there has been much
confusion amongst lower courts in determining the boundaries of school
authority and the extent of students' First Amendment rights in Internet
speech cases. 109 Courts have applied the Tinker, Fraser, Kuhlmeier and,
now, Morse standards in varying ways to decide Internet student speech
cases. 110 Moreover, some courts have found that school officials lack
disciplinary authority over student Internet expression altogether because
of the expression's off-campus nature.II Adding further confusion into the
equation is the issue of "true threats." If student Internet speech constitutes
a "true threat," Tinker and its progeny do not apply because threats are not
entitled to First Amendment protection.' 12
A. Pre-Morse Student Internet Speech Cases
In Beussink v. Woodland R-IV School District,113 a federal district court
applied Tinker to find that a student's First Amendment rights had been
violated.' 14 The student was suspended for ten days for posting a homepage
on the Internet which was critical of the school and included crude and
vulgar language.'l 5 Although several students saw the homepage and
109 See Bird, supra note 20, at 128 (determining that "the state of the law concerning off campus
Internet speech remains an open question."); see also Calvert & Richards, supra note 9 (showing that
"[liower courts, in brief, are left ... to fathom for themselves which rules apply to determine when
[student Internet] speech can be punished.").
110 See Hudson, supra note 9, at 19 (stating that "lower courts have applied school-related First
Amendment rulings to reach different results [in Internet-related student speech cases]."); see also"
Bird, supra note 20, at 128 (observing that the Tinker line of cases has "failed to establish clear
guidance" in Internet student speech cases and, as a result, "courts have showed little consistency in the
analyses used to reach their decisions"); see also Li, supra note 45, at 75 (noting that, before Morse,
lower courts applied Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier in determining whether a student's Internet speech
is protected by the First Amendment).
I11 See Hudson, supra note 9, at 24 (noting that lower courts are divided on the issue of whether
school officials can punish students for off-campus Internet expression); see also Bird, supra note 20, at
128 (stating that some courts have refused to recognize the school's disciplinary authority over student
Internet speech "simply because of the speech's off campus origin.").
112 See J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 854-55 (Pa. 2002) (stating that "true
threats" are unprotected by the First Amendment; however, even if a statement is not a "true threat,"
otherwise protected speech may be subject to regulation in a school setting under the Tinker line of
cases); see also Glenn, supra note 2, at 7 (noting that the "limitations on the regulation of free speech
set forth in the Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier cases do not apply to threats because they are not
protected speech under the Constitution."). See generally Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08
(1969) (per curiam) (holding that "true threats" are not constitutionally protected).
113 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
114 Id. at 1180 (holding that Beussink "ha[d] demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of
his First Amendment claim").
115 Id. at 1177.
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discussed it in the school's hallways, the court found that the homepage did
not "materially and substantially interfere with school discipline."1 6 The
court reasoned that "[d]isliking or being upset by the content of a student's
speech is not an acceptable justification for limiting student speech under
Tinker."117
In Emmett v. Kent School District, 118 a high school student was
suspended for "intimidation, harassment, [and] disruption to the
educational process" after posting a web page that contained "mock
"obituaries" and allowed visitors to "vote on who would "die next."119
Finding for the student, the District Court judge quickly rejected the
application of Fraser and Kuhlmeier.120 Although the judge discussed
Tinker,121 he never actually applied it to the case.122 Rather, he held that
the suspension violated the student's rights because the web page's "out-of-
school nature" took the speech "entirely outside of the school's supervision
or control."123 Further, the judge found that the web site did not constitute a
threat, despite the school's argument that schools are in an "acutely
difficult position" after recent school shootings around the country.124
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania came to the opposite conclusion
two years later in JS. v. Bethlehem Area School District.125 There, a
student was expelled for creating a web site titled "Teacher Sux" from his
home computer, which contained "derogatory, profane, offensive and
116 Id. at 1181.
117 ld.at 1180.
118 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
119 Id. at 1089. "[A]n evening television news story characterized [the student's] web site as
featuring a 'hit list' of people to be killed, although the words 'hit list' appear[ed]" appeared nowhere
on the web site." Id.
120 Id. at 1090. "In the present case, [the student's] speech was not at a school assembly, as in
Fraser, and was not in a school-sponsored newspaper, as in Kuhlmeier." Id.
121 See id. (mentioning that students do not lose their speech rights upon entering a school, but that
school prohibition may be justified if the speech materially and substantially interferes with the
operation of the school) (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509
(1969)).
122 See Caplan, supra note 11, at 153-54 (stating that the judge "relied explicitly on the limits of
school authority" in holding for the student); see also Hudson, supra note 9, at 17 (positing that
although "the judge at one point appeared to apply Tinker .... at another point, [he] seemed to suggest
that the case was simply beyond the power of school authorities to regulate at all").
123 Emmett, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 1090 ("Although the intended audience was undoubtedly connected
to [the school], the speech was entirely outside of the school's supervision or control.").
124 See id. The court found the school's argument to be persuasive, and agreed that web sites "can
be an early indication of a student's violent inclinations," but found that the school had "presented no
evidence that the mock obituaries and voting on this web site were intended to threaten anyone, did
actually threaten anyone, or manifested any violent tendencies whatsoever." Id.
125 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002) (finding that the school district did not violate the student's First
Amendment Rights).
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threatening comments" about the student's algebra teacher and principal.126
A portion of the web page, referring to the algebra teacher, was entitled
"Why Should She Die?"127 Under that heading was the phrase "give me
$20 to help pay for the hitman"; another page featured" a drawing that
depicted the teacher "with her head cut off and blood dripping from her
neck."1 28
Noting that "the Internet has complicated analysis of restrictions on
speech,"129 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the school district
did not violate the student's First Amendment rights by punishing him for
the web site. 130 First, the court looked at the "totality of the circumstances"
to find that the web page did not constitute a true threat.131 The court
reasoned that "[d]istasteful and even highly offensive communication does
not necessarily" rise to the level of a true threat, despite "the modem rash
of violent crimes in school settings."132
Next, although there was no dispute that the web site was created off-
campus, the court found "a sufficient nexus between the web site and the
school campus to consider the speech as occurring on-campus."' 33 The
court declared a broad definition of on-campus speech, stating that "where
speech that is aimed at a specific school and/or its personnel is brought
onto the school campus or accessed at school by its originator, the speech
will be considered on-campus speech."134
The court then decided that the school could punish the student under
126 Id. at 851. The web site made claims that the algebra teacher, Mrs. Fulmer, "should be fired,"
made fun of her appearance, and morphed a picture of Fulmer's face into that of Adolf Hitler. Id.
127 Id. (indicating that the student's site went beyond mere insults, and that there was a severity to
what the student was implying).
128 Id. at 851.
129 Id. at 863-64 (citing Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) (plurality)).
130 Id. at 850.
131 Id. at 859. The court noted the "criminal nature of a true threat analysis" and found that the web
page "did not reflect a serious expression of intent to inflict harm." Id. Rather, the court found, the web
site was a "sophomoric, crude, highly offensive and perhaps misguided attempt at humor or parody." Id.
132 Id. at 860. Of particular importance was that while the teacher was offended, "[t]he reaction of
some [other] viewers was evidently quite different." Id. at 859. Despite its repugnant message, many
viewers found the site humorous and "laugh[ed]" about it. Id. Moreover, the school district's "inaction"
in not punishing the student until after the school year was over "belie[d] its assertion that the web site
constituted a true threat." Id.
133 Id. at 865.
134 Id. at 865. The court found that the student "facilitated the on-campus nature of the speech by
accessing the web site on a school computer in a classroom, showing the site to another student, and by
informing other students at school of the existence of the website." Id. According to the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, "it was inevitable that the contents of the web site would pass from students to
teachers, inspiring circulation of the web page on school property." Id. However, in his concurring
opinion, Chief Justice Zappala argued that the majority's definition of on-campus speech was "overly
broad and unnecessary to the resolution of this case." Id. at 870 (Zappala, C.J., concurring).
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both the Tinker and Fraser standards.135 However, the court did not
articulate which standard it actually based its decision on because
"application of either case [would result] in a determination in favor of the
School District." 136 The court stated that, like the speech in Fraser, the web
site here was clearly "lewd, vulgar and plainly offensive," but noted that
"questions exist as to the applicability of Fraser" to off-campus Internet
speech.137 In applying Tinker, the court found that the student's web site
caused "actual and substantial disruption of the work of the school."138 The
web site "disrupted the entire school community" and caused "emotional
and physical injuries" to the algebra teacher.' 39
B. Post-Morse Student Internet Speech Cases
The cases previously discussed demonstrate the confusion in the state of
the law regarding school authority over students' off-campus Internet
speech.140 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's decision in Morse v.
Frederick1 41 has done nothing to resolve that confusion.142 In Morse, the
Court itself admitted that "there is some uncertainty at the outer
boundaries" of when a school can regulate student speech. 143 Certainly, off
campus student Internet expression stands at these "outer boundaries."' 144
The following subsections focus on three Internet-related student speech
135 See id. at 867-6968 (majority opinion) (holding that the speech at issue here was vulgar and
plainly offensive, thus meeting the Fraser standard, and then applying the Tinker standard, that the
speech caused actual and substantial disruption of schoolwork, because of the factual differences
between Fraser and the instant case).
136 Id. at 867 (asserting that it was not necessary to "definitively decide" which of the two
standards upon which to base the holding).
137 Id. at 868.
138 Id. at 869.
139 Id. at 869.
140 See discussion supra Part 11. A. (analyzing student Internet speech cases decided before
Morse).
141 127 U.S. 2618, 2624 (2007). (noting that there is uncertainty as to when courts should apply
school-speech precedents).
142 See Calvert & Richards, supra note 9 (noting that Morse has been of little help to lower courts
that have decided cases involving student Internet-related expression); see also David L. Hudson, Jr.,
Student Expression - What's On the Horizon, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, June 2007, http://www.
firstamendmentcenter.org/speech/studentexpression/horizon.aspx?topic=student-expression -horizon
(stating that lower courts are divided on whether school officials can punish students for off-campus
Internet expression and the Supreme Court "provided no guidance" on that issue in Morse).
143 See Morse, 127 U.S. at 2624 ; but cf 127 U.S. at 2638 (Alito, J., concurring) (describing the
school's regulation of Frederick's banner as "standing at the far reaches of what the First Amendment
permits").
144 See Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 595 (W.D. Pa. 2007) ("The
difficulty is in articulating the appropriate constitutional boundaries as to the breadth of public school
disciplinary authority in [the student Internet expression] factual scenario."); see also Hudson, supra
note 141 ("Some of this uncertainty extends to the arena of student online expression.").
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cases that were decided after Morse: Wisniewski v. Board of Education of
Weedsport Central School District,145 Layshock v. Hermitage School
District,146 and Doninger v. Niehoff.147 These cases demonstrate that
courts remain divided, and have become further perplexed, over how to
decide student Internet speech cases following Morse.
a. Wisniewski v. Board of Education of Weedsport Central School
District
Aaron Wisniewski, an eighth grade student at Weedsport Middle School,
created an AOL Instant Messenger buddy icon on his parents' home
computer in April 2001.148 The icon was "a small drawing of a pistol firing
a bullet at a person's head, above which were dots representing spattered
blood."149 Beneath the drawing appeared the words "Kill Mr.
VanderMolen," Aaron's then English teacher.150 The student intended the
icon "as a joke," but school officials determined that it constituted a threat
and suspended him for one semester. 151
Although the student created and transmitted the icon off campus, it did
not "insulate him from school discipline."1 52 The Second Circuit applied
145 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that a student's instant messenger icon of a student firing a
bullet at a person's head was not protected speech under the First Amendment).
146 496 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (ruling that a student's Internet parody of his school
principle is protected under the First Amendment).
147 514 F. Supp. 2d 199 (D. Conn. 2007) (deciding that the First Amendment does not protect a
student's right to post intemet opinions on her school's administration and its decisions).
148 Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 35-36. As the court explained, a buddy icon ...... permits the sender of
IM messages to display on the computer screen an icon, created by the sender, which serves as an
identifier of the sender, in addition to the sender's name .... [The icon] remain[s] on the screen during
the exchange of text messages between the two 'buddies,' and each can copy the icon of the other and
transmit it to any other 'buddy' during an IM exchange."Id.
149 Id. at 36.
150 Id.
151 Wisniewski v. Bd. Of Educ. of Weedsport Central Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 36-37 (2d Cir.
2007). A police investigator and a psychologist determined that Aaron meant for the icon to be a joke
and that he did not pose a real threat. Id. at 36. However, the school's attorney a designated
superintendent's hearing officer found that "the icon was threatening and should not have been
understood as a joke." Id. at 36.
152 Id. at 39. The court stated that the Second Circuit has "recognized that off-campus conduct can
create a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption within a school." Id. (citing Thomas v. Bd. of Educ.,
Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 n.17 (2d Cir. 1979)). However, the court's reliance on
Thomas for extending the arm of school authority off school grounds is deceptive and unavailing.
Indeed, Thomas stands for just the opposite proposition, as it declared that students' free expression
rights are at their "zenith" for off-campus speech. See Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1050; see also Papandrea,
supra note 47 at 1061 n.279 (2008). Noting that it is impossible to reconcile the Wisniewski decision
with Thomas, because in Thomas the student speech was protected, even where the students did some
work on their papers at school, occasionally consulted with a teacher, and left some copies of the papers
in a school closet. Papandrea, supra note 47 at 1060, n. 279. Moreover, the language that the
Wisniewski court relied upon is pure dicta, a hypothetical buried within a footnote in Thomas. See
Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1052 n.17.
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Tinker and held that the suspension did not violate the student's First
Amendment rights.153  Relying on Morse's broad interpretation of
Tinker,154 the court found that "it was reasonably foreseeable that the IM
icon would come to the attention of school authorities," and, once it did,
"the risk of substantial disruption [was] not only reasonable, but clear."1 55
The court reasoned that "as in Morse," the student was not disciplined "for
conduct that was merely offensive", or merely in conflict with some view
of the school's 'educational mission." 156'
b. Layshock v. Hermitage School District
Only five days after Wisniewski was decided, a federal district court took
a much narrower view of school authority over student Internet speech in
Layshock v. Hermitage School District.157 Justin Layshock, a high school
senior, used his grandmother's home computer to create a MySpace parody
profile that ridiculed his school principal.158 The profile contained "silly"
and "crude" answers to questions, which appeared to be by and about the
principal.159 After administrators discovered that Justin had created the
profile, he was suspended for ten days, placed in an alternative curriculum,
and prohibited from participating in the school's graduation ceremony.160
Declining to read Morse as expanding the deference permitted to school
153 See Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38-39. The court rejected the application of the "true threat"
standard of Watts because "school officials have significantly broader authority to sanction student
speech than the Watts standard allows."' Id. at 38.
154 See id. at 38 ("Tinker held that student expression may not be suppressed unless school officials
reasonably conclude that it will materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the
school.") (emphasis added) (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 127 U.S. 2618, 2626 (2007)); see also
Student's Off-Campus Waft of Text Message Threatening Teacher Warrants Suspension, 76 U.S.L.W.
1045 (July 17, 2007) [hereinafter Student's Off-Campus Text Message] (noting that the Wisniewski
court applied a broad interpretation of Tinker "[a]s recently construed in Morse v. Frederick"). Cf
Allison Torres Burtka, Student's IM Threat is Not Protected Speech, Second Circuit Says, TRIAL, Sept.
2007, at 68, 70 (quoting an attorney for Wisniewski's school, arguing that because the Wisniewski court
used a "reasonably foreseeable" test rather than a "true threat" test, "school officials [now] have broader
authority" to impose discipline).
155 Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39-40. The court reasoned that the "potentially threatening content of
the icon and the extensive distribution of it, which encompassed 15 recipients, including some of
Aaron's classmates, during a three-week circulation period, made this risk at least foreseeable ... if not
inevitable." Id. It did not matter whether or not the student "intended his IM icon to be communicated
to school authorities or, if communicated, to cause a substantial disruption." Id. at 40.
156 Id. at 40 (citation omitted).
157 496 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Pa. 2007).
158 Id. at 591.
159 Id. at 591. For example, the profile characterized the principal as a "big fag," "big whore," and
"big steroid freak" and stated that the principal had a "big keg behind [his] desk" and had smoked a
"big blunt" in the past month. Id.
160 Id. at 593-94.
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officials, the court ruled for the student on his First Amendment claim.161
The court stated that school officials are not authorized to become "censors
of the world-wide web"'162 and must demonstrate an "appropriate nexus"
between a student's Internet speech and a substantial disruption of the
school environment. 163 Moreover, the court did not defer to the conclusions
of school administrators on this "threshold jurisdictional "question."' 64
Thus, the court declared that the substantial disruption standard was not
met through the school officials' mere "fear of future disturbances."165
c. Doninger v. Niehoff
The Federal District of Connecticut extended the arm of school
authority further into cyberspace in Doninger v. Niehoff.166 There, a high
school student posted an entry to her Livejoumal.com1 67 Internet blog to
express frustrations at school officials over developments regarding a
music festival she had been planning.168 The post described school officials
as "douchebags" and called on students and their parents to write the
school superintendent in order to "piss her off more." 169 Although the
161 Id. at 596-99 (stating that Morse does not permit school officials "unfettered latitude" to
censor off-campus Internet speech and has "not changed th[e] basic framework" of the relationship
between Tinker and the Supreme Court's other seminal student-speech cases). See Lee, supra note 105
(arguing that the Layshock court's reading of Morse and the cases that preceded it is "reasonable and
fair" and stating suggesting that, if followed, "fears that Morse will expand to swallow students' First
Amendment rights will prove to be unfounded").
162 Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 597 (W.D. Pa. 2007).
163 Id. at 599-600. Here, in Layshock, there were "several gaps in the causation link" between the
student's MySpace page and any material and "substantial disruption of operations in the school.."
Indeed, the school did not demonstrate "that the buzz"or discussions in the school were caused by
Justin's profile as opposed to the reaction of administrators."." Id. at 600.
164 Id. at 599. Likening the facts of this case to those of Thomas, the court noted that "the actual
charges made by the School District were directed only at [the student's] off-campus conduct." See id.
at 601 (citing Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 (2d Cir. 1979)). Indeed, Thomas stands for
the proposition that the reach of public school authority is not unlimited. See id. at 597. Thus, as in
Thomas, administrators' bald assertions that off-campus expression caused a material and substantial
disruption in the school did not justify regulation of expression that had a "de minimis" connection to
any activity within the school itself. See id. at 598 (citing Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1050).
165 Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 601. "The actual disruption was rather minimal -- no classes were
cancelled, no widespread disorder occurred, there was no violence or student disciplinary action." Id. at
600 (emphasis added). Moreover, despite that fact that there were "some student comments" made
about the MySpace profile, did not allow "the "[s]chool's right to maintain an environment conducive
to learning does not[to] trump [the student]'s right to freedom of expression" the student's First
Amendment rights. Id. at 600-1.
166 514 F. Supp. 2d 199 (D. Conn. 2007).
167 Id. at 206. ""[L]ivejoumal.com is an online community that allows its members to post their
own blog entries and comment on the blog entries of others." Id. At the time the student posted her blog
entry, her privacy setting was "public," which meant that anyone could view the webpage. Id.
168 Id. at 206 (discussing the comments posted by the student on her blog).
169 Id. at 206. ("[G]et an idea of what to write if you want to write something or call [Ms.
Schwartz] to piss her offmore.") (citing Defendants' Exhibit C).
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student was not suspended or removed from school, when school officials
discovered the message, they disqualified her from running for class
secretary during her senior year. 170
Stating that the blog interfered with the school's "highly appropriate
function to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public
discourse," the court held that school officials were justified in punishing
the student for her "offensive speech" under Fraser and Morse.171 The
court recognized that this case was not "just like Fraser" because the blog
was created off-campus.1 72 However, the court applied Wisniewski's new
"reasonably foreseeable" test to characterize the student's blog entry as
"on-campus speech" and, thus, side-stepped this difficulty. 173 The court
reasoned that it was "reasonably foreseeable" that the blog's message
would reach campus because the content of the blog was "related to school
issues," school community members "were likely to read it," and it was
likely that school officials "would become aware of it."174
IV. THE AD Hoc APPROACH EMPLOYED BY COURTS IN INTERNET-
RELATED STUDENT SPEECH CASES HAS UTTERLY FAILED TO STRIKE THE
APPROPRIATE BALANCE BETWEEN SCHOOL AUTHORITY AND STUDENTS'
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
As their decisions clearly demonstrate, 175 lower courts are left to their
own devices in determining the proper bounds of school authority over
student Internet speech. 176 Courts have disparately applied United States
Supreme Court school speech precedents to student Internet-related speech
cases. Moreover, some courts have incorporated the "true threat" standard
170 Id. at 202 (mentioning that school officials advised Avery before the blog posting about of the
proper way to address issues of concern with the administration).
171 See id. at 215-17 (D. Conn. 2007) ("There can be no question that teaching students the values
of civility and respect for the dignity of others is a legitimate school objective.") (citing Morse v.
Frederick, 127 U.S. 2618, 2626 (2007)).
172 Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 216 (D. Conn. 2007).
173 See id. at 217 ("Under Wisniewski, . . . the Court believes that [the student]'s blog may be
considered on-campus speech for the purposes of the First Amendment."); see also id. at 217 n. 11
(stating that "[there is] no reason to deny the application of Fraser to off-campus speech that affects the
school in a reasonably foreseeable manner and that would otherwise be analyzed under Fraser had it
actually occurred on-campus.").
174 Id. at 217. The court also emphasized that the blog was "purposely designed" by the student to
"come onto the campus." Id. at 216.
175 See discussion supra Part 111. A-B. (analyzing Wisniewski, Layshock, and Doninger).
176 See Calvert & Richards, supra note 9 (noting that lower courts must "fathom for themselves"
which rules apply to determine whether when [student Internet] speech can be punished"); see also
Cassel, supra note 6, at 663 ("[L]ower courts have used a variety of approaches to determine whether
Internet speech is protected").
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and others have struggled with the "on-campus/off-campus" distinction.
Further, courts have focused on the epidemic of school violence in the
United States, while failing to recognize the student's perspective. Without
a uniform standard for Internet-related student speech cases, it is inevitable
that the line between school authority and students' First Amendment
rights will become unintelligible.
A. Haphazard Application of Supreme Court School Speech Precedents
School administrators and lower courts have applied the Court's school
speech cases arbitrarily to justify their desired ends in Internet-related
student speech cases. Although most courts purport to apply Tinker,177
other courts apply Fraser or a combination of Tinker and Fraser.178
Moreover, courts have incorporated the reasoning of Kuhlmeier and Morse,
which is highly deferential to school officials, into their decisions.1 79 This
ad hoc approach has rendered the scope of students' First Amendment
rights uncertain and will only lead to further ambiguity in the absence of a
uniform standard.180
B. Selective Application and Manipulation of the "True Threat" Standard
Public school officials may punish a student for off-campus Internet
expression that constitutes a "true threat."181 However, because the "true
177 See Bird, supra note 20, at 127 (noting that many courts have analyzed student Internet speech
"under the Tinker analysis of material and substantial disruption"); see also Hudson, supra note 9, at 21
(stating that most courts continue to apply Tinker to student Internet speech cases).
178 See, e.g., J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 867-69 (Pa. 2002) (holding that a
student's suspension for off-campus Internet speech was justified under both Tinker and Fraser);
Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 216 (D. Conn. 2007) (finding that student speech posted on
the Internet was "closer to Fraser than to Tinker"). See generally Hudson, supra note 9, at 19 ("[C]ourts
disagree on whether to apply Tinker, Fraser or both .... ).
179 See, e.g., Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2007) (discussing the level of
severity of the student's conduct in Morse which allowed for punishment by school officials);
Doninger, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 217 (interpreting Morse expansively); but see Layshock v. Hermitage
Sch. Dist. 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 595 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (declining to read Morse expansively).
180 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 309 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[O]ur
jurisprudence now says that students have a right to speak in schools except when they don't - a
standard continuously developed through litigation against local schools and their administrators."); see
also Richard V. Blystone, School Speech v. School Safety: In the Aftermath of Violence on School
Campuses Throughout This Nation, How Should School Officials Respond to Threatening Student
Expression?, 2007 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 199, 215 (2007) ("With no clear indication in the law ... that
school administrators have the broadest discretion available to them, punished students are more likely
to sue their local school board on the basis that their First Amendment rights were violated."); Li, supra
note 45, at 88-89 (arguing that in the absence of a "clear, new standard," courts will continue to
"misinterpret" Tinker and its progeny, thereby endangering students' free speech rights).
181 See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (holding that true 'threats' are not
protected by the First Amendment); see also Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608 (5th Cir.
2004) ("[T]he government can proscribe a true threat of violence without offending the First
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threat" standard places too heavy a burden on schools,182 courts have
broadly applied Tinker's "substantial disruption" prong to uphold school
regulation of off-campus Internet expression that would otherwise be
subject to the "true threat" standard.183 This tactic renders the protections
of the "true threat" standard meaningless and leaves Tinker's "substantial
disruption" standard with "no real effect."1 84 Indeed, it allows school
officials to regulate student speech "based solely on the emotive impact
that its offensive content may have on a listener." 185 This flies in the face
of Tinker, which articulates that the mere desire to avoid "discomfort" or
"unpleasantness" is not enough to justify restricting student speech.186
Undoubtedly, the growing trend of violence among students in our
country has influenced courts' decisions to give school officials greater
deference over student Internet speech.1 87 Some courts have argued that
Amendment."); Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 371 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that true
threats are not entitled to First Amendment protection, "regardless of whether the conduct occurred on
or off campus"); Bird, supra note 20, at 11l ("School districts surely have a right-even a duty-to
discipline student speech that rises to the level of a threat.").
182 See Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38 (positing that "school officials have significantly broader
authority to sanction student speech than the Watts standard allows."); see also J.S., 807 A.2d at 859
(stating that the "criminal nature" of the true threat analysis makes it a narrow exception to the right of
free speech stating that because of the "narrowness to the exceptions to the right of free speech" and the
"criminal nature of a true threat analysis," the statements made by the student in J.S. "did not constitute
a true threat"). See generally Cassel, supra note 6, at 672 ("The Supreme Court has not evaluated the
true threat doctrine outside the criminal context").
183 See Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38 (explaining that Tinker was the appropriate standard to evaluate
"school officials' authority "to discipline a student's [Internet] expression reasonably understood as
urging violent conduct"); J.S., 807 A.2d at 860, 869 (holding that although a student's off-campus
Internet expression did not constitute a "true threat," the school could regulate it under Tinker because
its emotional impact on a teacher and the "expressed anxiety" of certain students constituted a
"substantial interference with the work of the school"); but see Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d
779, 784, 786 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (finding that a student's web page, which listed names of people the
student "wish[ed] would die," did not constitute a 'true threat' and, thus, could not be regulated without
"proof of disruption to the school" under Tinker).
184 See Guiles ex rel. Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320, 328 (2d Cir. 2006) (reasoning that a broad
interpretation of Tinker gives the Tinker rule "no real effect" because school administrators would be
permitted to censure student speech merely on the basis of finding it "offensive and repugnant to their
sense ... of decency"); see also Burtka, supra note 153, at 70 (stating that the Wisniewski court used a
"'reasonably foreseeable' test rather than a 'true threat' test" and, thus, allowed school officials broader
authority to impose discipline for off-campus Internet speech).
185 Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 597 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (citing Saxe v.
State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001)).
186 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969) (stating that "[a
school] must be able to show that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid
the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint."). See Jacobs v.
Clark County Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that unless a school can show
considerable compromising of its operation, it may not suppress the controversial or unfavorable
speech).
187 See, e.g., Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (arguing
observing that "school administrators are in an acutely difficult position after recent school shootings..
.. Web sites can be an early indication of a student's violent inclinations, and can spread those beliefs
quickly to like-minded or susceptible people."); J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 860
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schools should have "boundless authority" to discipline Internet speech in
the name of safety.188 However, as Wisniewski v. Board of Education of
Weedsport Central School Districtl89 demonstrates, this argument proves
too much.190 The Second Circuit heard Wisniewski just one day after the
tragic shooting spree at Virginia Tech University in April 2007.191
Although a police investigator and a psychologist determined that the
student meant his violent IM buddy icon "as a joke," the court deferred to a
school attorney's determination that "the icon was threatening and should
not have been understood as a joke." 192 Thus, the court allowed school
officials' "undifferentiated fear or apprehension" of disturbance" to
overcome the student's right to freedom of expression. 193
C. The On-Campus/Off-Campus Distinction is Unworkable in Student
Internet Speech Cases
Attempts to distinguish between on-campus and off-campus Internet
speech have complicated the analysis of Intemet-related student speech
cases, largely because the Internet is a "borderless medium."194 In order to
(Pa. 2002) (explaining that "in schools today violence is unfortunately too common and the horrific
events at Columbine High School, Colorado remain fresh in the country's mind."). See generally Li,
supra note 45, at 90 (noting that describing how tragic school shootings factor into courts' decision-
making in Internet-related student speech cases).
188 See Blystone, supra note 179, at 215-16 (arguing that "the First Amendment should take a
back seat while teachers and administrators are given the broadest discretion permissible under the law
to discipline students "); see also Burtka, supra note 153, at 70-71 (stating that school officials need
the power to "mak[e] decisions quickly about a potential threat" and should not have to "'be in the
situation of parsing through whether [student Intemet speech is] a joke').
189 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007).
190 See Burtka, supra note 153, at 70 (suggesting that after Wisniewski, courts are ...... heading
toward zero tolerance'); see also Bird, supra note 20, at 140-41 (arguing contending that cases
decisions giving school officials "boundless authority" to discipline off campus Intemet speech create
"dangerously broad precedent" and administrators faced with similar situations in the future "will be
more likely to limit student speech upon any showing that student speech constitutes a threat")
(emphasis added).
191 See Burtka, supra note 153, at 69 (noting that "[t]The court heard the case the day after the
Virginia Tech shootings in April."); see also Ian Urbina and Suevon Lee, For School, Several Ties to
Shootings, N.Y. TIMES, April 18, 2007, at A 18 (indicating the date of the 2007 Virginia Tech campus
shootings).
192 See Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2007). The school board's attorney
designated hearing officer at Wisniewski's superintendent hearing "acknowledged the opinions of the
police investigator and the psychologist," but concluded that the student "did commit the act of
threatening a teacher. . . [which] creat[ed] an environment threatening the health, safety and welfare of
others." Id. at 36-37.
193 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969). Indeed, the
student was punished "for making a threat when no one thought it was a true threat." See Burtka, supra
note 153, at 69. Unfortunately, in Wisniewski, the only true victim here was the student. After he served
his one semester suspension and returned to school, "school and community hostility" forced the
student and his family to move to another town. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 37.
194 See Li, supra note 45, at 93 (arguing that the Internet is a "borderless medium" because it is
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bring off-campus Internet expression under the arm of school authority,
some courts have given an overly -expansive definition to "on-campus"
speech.195 Other courts, however, have defined "on-campus" speech so
narrowly that it has divested school officials of almost any meaningful
disciplinary authority over student Internet speech.196
Attempts to classify Internet speech as "on-campus" or "off-campus....
overlook Tinker's focus on whether material disruptions in the school
environment have occurred or are likely to occur. As a practical matter, the
expression at issue in Internet-related student speech cases almost always
occurs "off-campus."1 97 However, the concern is the effect of the speech
on the school environment, not merely where it was created.198 Thus,
students are free to express themselves from their personal computers
however they choose, so long as they do so without materially and
substantially disrupting the school environment. 199
"ever-present and easily accessible" and, thus, the "old distinctions physically demarcating authority
over student speech to on or off-campus are not adequate"); see also Cassel, supra note 6, at 663
(stating that prevalent student Internet use has made distinguishing between on-campus and off-campus
Internet speech "more difficult than in previous speech cases").
195 See, e.g., Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38-40 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that school officials could
punish a student for his IM buddy icon because "it was "reasonably foreseeable" that the IM icon
"would come to the attention of school authorities," regardless of whether or not the student actually
"intended his IM icon to be communicated to school authorities"); Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp.
2d 199, 216-17 (D. Conn. 2007) (finding that a student's Internet blog post was "on-campus speech"
because the student "purposely designed [it] to come onto the campus," "the content of the blog was
related to school issues," and "other [school] community members were likely to read it"); J.S. v.
Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 865 (Pa. 2002) (holding that "[w]here speech that is aimed at
a specific school and/or its personnel is brought onto the school campus or accessed at school by its
originator, the speech will be considered on-campus speech.").
196 See, e.g., Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 784 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (finding that a
student's web site was "off-campus speech" because it was not created on school property); Emmett v.
Kent Sch. Dist., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (holding that although the intended
audience of a student's web page was "undoubtedly connected" to the school, the page was "off-
campus speech" because it was "not produced in connection with any class or school project").
197 See Bird, supra note 20, at 127 (stating that most Internet-related student speech cases "involve
situations where students create and maintain off campus websites"); see also Cassel, supra note 6, at
665 ("MySpace speech generally occurs as strictly off-campus speech."); Kennedy, supra note 18
(arguing that most accusations that a school district has violated a student's First Amendment rights for
punishing Internet speech stem from postings made on an off-campus computer).
198 See Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 n.17 (2d Cir. 1979) (noting that it is possible
for a student to "incite" a material and substantial disruption within the school "from some remote
locale"); see also Grant, supra note 2 (stating that Internet expression can often result in "conflicts that
spill onto the school campus"); Paula Reed Ward, Schools Perceive Threat to Authority in Student
Internet Postings, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Feb. 5, 2006, available at http://www.post-
gazette.com/pg/06036/649819-104.stm (positing that school officials have constitutional authority to
limit student Internet expression when it "causes, or is likely to cause, substantial disruption .... [no]
matter where the offending speech occurs").
199 See Hudson, supra note 9, at 21 (positing suggesting that the Tinker standard is "appropriate
and workable" because it gives students the right to express their thoughts freely, until that expression
"caus[es] substantial harm"); see also Cassel, supra note 6, at 665 (arguing that "unless the school can
prove an actual disruption on-campus, the school should not punish or prohibit [Internet] speech.").
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Solely because of its off-campus nature, some commentators argue that
school officials have no authority to punish students for Internet
expression.200 These authors fear that school administrators will arbitrarily
use their authority to punish students for Internet expression that ridicules
school personnel or deviates from the values that the school wishes to
promote. 201 Although these fears are reasonable, they are an unavailing
justification for adherence to the unworkable on-campus/off-campus
distinction in Internet student speech cases. These arguments, however,
overlook that schools sometimes have legitimate reasons for regulating
Internet speech.202 Moreover, these arguments fail to recognize Tinker's
protection of student First Amendment rights against arbitrary and
capricious action.203 Tinker declared that "school officials cannot suppress
expressions of feelings with which they do not wish to contend." 204 Indeed,
Tinker strikes the appropriate balance between school authority and
students' First Amendment rights in Internet student speech cases. 205
200 See, e.g., Caplan, supra note 11, at 162 (stating that the argument that schools may discipline
Internet speech because it "adversely affected the educational process within the school" is unfounded
because "there are any number of off-campus activities a student might undertake that lead to gossip
and distraction"); Cato, supra note 7 (noting that "[s]tudents aren't doing anything today they didn't do
in decades past - they're simply using a different medium.").
201 See Caplan, supra note 11, at 161 (arguing that "[s]chools that punish students for wearing
Marilyn Manson t-shirts or waving confederate flags at school do not attempt to discipline students for
doing so off-campus, yet off-campus criticism of school authority is far more likely to result in
academic punishment."); see also Calvert & Richards, supra note 9 (noting that there are many cases
appearing across the country where in which students have been punished "[i]n retaliation" for off-
campus Internet speech that "attacks, criticizes or otherwise offends school officials, teachers or fellow
students" and the school asserts that its authority extends far beyond "the geographic borders of the
campus").
202 See Hudson, supra note 9, at 21 (stating that "[c]ourts have knocked down schools when they
rely on the 'I don't like the student speech' rationale .... But when schools [provide[] evidence of how
off-campus expression ha[s] a negative impact at school, the courts [are] much more deferential."); see
also Li, supra note 45, at 104 (noting that "if a student's Interet-related student speech is violent or
offensive enough to substantially disrupt the school's operations or violate the rights of others, the
school may suspend or expel the student.").
203 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (arguing
explaining that "[s]chool officials do not possess absolute authority over their students .... [Students]
may not be confined to the expression of those sentiments that are officially approved."); see also
Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1180 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (positing that
"[d]isliking or being upset by the content of a student's speech is not an acceptable justification for
limiting student speech under Tinker.").
204 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
205 See Hudson, supra note 9, at 21 (stating noting that Nancy Willard, head of the Center for Safe
and Responsible Internet Use, believes that "Tinker is a good balance" between school authority and
students' First Amendment rights in Internet-related student speech cases); see also Li, supra note 45, at
102 (arguing that "[The Tinker standard] is both broad and flexible enough to balance the needs of a
student's right to self-expression and the school's need to maintain an orderly and safe educational
environment.").
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D. Courts Have Failed to Recognize that Sometimes "Kids will be Kids"
Courts have failed to achieve the "delicate balance" between the
recognition of the growing trend of hostility in American schools and the
reality that students in public schools are "nevertheless children." 206
Students have engaged in childish banter and mocked teachers, school
administrators and fellow students for decades. 207 Today, students have
opened their views to the world by venting frustrations and expressing
opinions on the Internet.208 However, cultural changes have led today's
students to express sentiments that are much more violent and "crude" than
those of their predecessors. 209 Failing to appreciate these societal changes,
school administrators have "overreacted" and punished students for
Internet expression that other students immediately recognize as nonsense
or "sick humor." 210
Some judges have ignored this "cultural reality"211 in placing their
imprimatur on rash punishments by school officials for student Internet
expression. Indeed, judges are "so far removed" from popular teen culture
206 See J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d 412, 428 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 2000) (Friedman, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that the court must "strike a delicate balance between the recognition of the
dangers" that exist in schools today and the reality that no matter how sophisticated children today may
be, they are, nevertheless, children); see also Li, supra note 45, at 91 (arguing that judges have focused
on "uncommon, tragic events like Columbine," while failing to recognize that "children are
impressionable" and often imitate "crude and even violent" speech to which they are exposed through
popular teen culture). See generally Caplan, supra note 11, at 154 (noting that, although the Internet has
greatly increased opportunities for "immature and foolishly defiant" students to be heard, schools must
respect the First Amendment by in "adjust[ing] to the new challenges created by such students and the
[I]nternet").
207 See Ward, supra note 197 (positing that "[ilIt's a problem as old as schools themselves -
students making fun of their teachers and administrators .... In the past, it could have been as simple
as a sniggering comment behind someone's back. Or a drawing on a bathroom wall."); see also Grant,
supra note 2 (stating that "[b]ullies of yesteryear spread ugly rumors and abused their peers in
schoolyards, cafeterias and bus stops.").
208 See Calvert & Richards, supra note 9 (arguing noting that "messages that once were posted on
bathroom walls, scrawled in notebooks and passed from classmate to classmate on spiral-bound paper
are suddenly going online off-campus, waiting for all to see and read."); Cato, supra note 7 (explaining
that "[s]tudents aren't doing anything today they didn't do in decades past - they're simply using a
different medium .... Pictures and messages that used to be scribbled on paper and passed in class are
now posted online.").
209 See Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Columbine Fallout: The Long-Term Effects on Free
Expression Take Hold in Public Schools, 83 B.U. L. REv. 1089, 1110 (2003) (stating that popular teen
culture is "saturated with violent imagery and profane language" and the expression of those same ideas
by students "is only a natural reflection of their environment"); see also King, supra note 27 (noting
that ..... [olbscenity over the course of society has been a changing climate""').
210 See J.S., 757 A.2d at 45, & 45 n. 6 (Friedman, J., dissenting) (arguing that a school district
failed to recognize the full context of the situation in punishing a student for his web site where fellow
students undoubtedly perceived the site as the "type of sick humor [that] can be found in some of
today's popular television programs, such as South Park"); see also Ward, supra note 197 (stating that
school administrators "often tend to overreact" to student Internet speech in the name of "maintaining
order").
211 Richards & Calvert, supra note 208, at 1112.
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that they have difficulty understanding it.212 Many courts focus on tragic
events like the Virginia Tech shootings, but "fail to grasp the student's
perspective." 213 This failure to recognize the evolution of normal childhood
behavior will only lead to greater deference for school officials to punish
Internet expression that they do not understand or agree with.214 As a
result, students will be left without a remedy when a school's "abuse of
discretion" violates their First Amendment rights. 215
V. SCHOOL AUTHORITY OVER INTERNET-RELATED STUDENT SPEECH IS
NOT UNLIMITED AND ALTERNATIVES TO HARSH AND POTENTIALLY
UNCONSTITUTIONAL PUNISHMENTS EXIST
Although a school may regulate Internet expression where it causes a
"material and substantial disruption," 216 schools do not have unlimited
authority over Internet speech merely because students are "subject to
compulsory attendance laws for part of the week." 217 School officials
should recognize that the boundaries of school authority over student
Internet speech are far from delineated. 218  Moreover, imprudent
punishments for Internet speech have the potential to do more harm to
212 Richards & Calvert, supra note 208, at 1110 (observing that judges are generationally "so far
removed" from teen popular culture that "they have trouble understanding it"). See Li, supra note 45, at
90 (noting that "[a]ccentuating this judicial misconception is discussing the "generation gap between
judges and students -" and suggesting that "many judges do not understand popular culture... ").
213 See Li, supra note 45, at 90 (arguing that courts have factored tragic school shootings into their
decision-making, but have failed to recognize that "teens are immersed in this culture and are inundated
with violent and profane imagery every day"); see also Richards & Calvert, supra note 208, at 1110
(observing that "Im]any judges simply ignore the pervasive social reality of music, movies, and violent
video games in which teens develop, while they concentrate instead on a few random school shootings
to justify their opinions").
214 See Hudson & Ferguson, Jr., supra note 21, at 181-182 (noting that, after school shootings
around the country, "censorship by school officials has only escalated" and many courts "sanction this
conduct" by granting school officials more deference). See generally Bird, supra note 20, at 129
(discussing the hesitance of courts to "substitute their judgment for that of local school authority").
215 See Bird, supra note 20, at 129 (positing that the "general custom of deference" makes courts
reluctant to step in and provide a remedy when a school's exercise of authority results in an "abuse of
discretion"); see also Hudson & Ferguson, Jr., supra note 21, at 181-82 (stating that deference to
school administrators in the wake of school violence has resulted in a "reduced level of constitutional
protection for student free-expression rights").
216 Cassel, supra note 6, at 674-78 . See supra note 198 and accompanying text discussing the
rights of students to express themselves off-campus so long as such expression does not have a
significant harmful effect on others).
217 Caplan, supra note 11, at 140. See generally Bird, supra note 20, at 141 (arguing that school
authority over student speech does not exist "around-the-clock").
218 See Bird, supra note 20, at 141 (noting that school officials are "searching for guidance" in
determining boundaries of their authority over Internet speech); see also Cassel, supra note 6, at 680
(stating that "[d]ue to sparse and inconsistent judicial guidance, schools are unsure of the appropriate
limits in disciplining [Internet] behavior.").
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students and the school environment than the expression itself.219 To avoid
the impact of unconstitutional punishments, schools must utilize less
invasive means to deal with Internet expression that they find problematic.
First and foremost, school officials must avoid "knee-jerk" reactions to
Internet speech that they simply do not like or find offensive. 220 One
cannot help but wonder if litigation would have been spared if school
administrators had not overreacted to the Internet expression in cases like
Layshock v. Hermitage School District22 1 and Doninger v. Niehoff222
Further, although their authority over Internet speech "may be limited,"
school officials are not "bound to ignore harmful Internet content."223
Before exacting a potentially unconstitutional punishment, administrators
should ask the student to remove the offensive expression from the
Internet, speak to the student or notify the student's parents. 224
Moreover, both courts and school officials have overlooked the
importance of parents taking part in monitoring and disciplining student
Internet conduct. 225 Much of the expression that administrators find
219 See Kathryn E. McIntyre, Hysteria Trumps First Amendment: Balancing Student Speech with
School Safety, 7 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 39, 53 (2002) (explaining that "[arbitrarily]
[c]losing the doors of an educational facility to a student by disciplining or punishing his expression...
is not consistent with the goal of education or the First Amendment."); see also Cato, supra note 7
(positing that "[o]ne thing you can do to guarantee that everyone in the school will want to see a [web]
site is to suspend someone over it."); Ward, supra note 197 (stating that school officials in Layshock
might have gone too far by "sticking a reportedly good student in Alternative Education" for web
expression that merely hurt someone's feelings).
220 Hudson, supra note 9, at 23. See Cato, supra note 7 (arguing that "[t]here are a lot of things
kids will do that get under your skin.., but you don't always have to react.").
221 496 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Pa. 2007). In Layshock, a school principal became very emotional
over a student's MySpace parody profile, which mocked and ridiculed the principal. Id. at 591-592. As
a result, the principal directed teachers to send all students who might have information about the
profile to his office. Id. at 592. The court stated that it was likely that the "substantial disruption" that
the school claimed was caused by the reactions of administrators, rather than the student's Internet
expression. Id. at 600.
222 514 F. Supp. 2d 199 (D. Conn. 2007). In Doninger, a student's mother encouraged the school
principal to "reconsider" a punishment that was triggered by the principal's immediate reaction to the
student's Internet blog post. Id. at 208. The mother informed school officials that she felt the
punishment was "an overreaching response with enormous consequences." Id. Instead, the mother
urged the school officials to exert a "more appropriate punishment." Id. However, school officials
refused because they felt that the student needed to be taught a lesson. See id. at 202. Surely, if school
officials had been willing to work with the student's parents, the student and her parents would not have
felt compelled to bring a law suit to vindicate the student's First Amendment rights.
223 Hudson, supra note 9, at 23. (discussing how educators might go about communicating with
students and parents regarding informed Internet use).
224 Id. at 24 (suggesting actions school officials should take when faced with offensive Internet
content posted by a student). Cf Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177-78
(E.D. Mo. 1998) (holding that a school district violated a student's First Amendment rights where the
school's principal, upon viewing the student's homepage, became upset and immediately decided to
discipline the student without speaking to the student first). See generally Ramasastry, supra note 6
(stating noting that "[MySpace] will remove fake profiles by impersonators - a remedy that can be used
by faculty, administrators or students who discover fake profiles claiming to be theirs.").
225 See Hudson, supra note 8 (stating that courts have come to varying conclusions in student
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objectionable is created in the home, during non-school hours.226 Indeed,
parents are often in the best position to protect students from harmful
Internet expression. 227 However, arguments that regulation of student
expression is solely the province of parents go too far.228 For example,
arguments like "[schools] cannot play substitute parents when students are
at home" 229 focus wholly on the unworkable on-campus/off-campus
distinction, while ignoring the effect that Internet expression may have on a
school.230 Thus, regulation of student Internet expression is neither purely a
matter of parental discipline, nor purely a matter of school discipline.
VI. A SOLUTION TO ENSURE A FAIR AND WORKABLE BALANCE BETWEEN
STUDENTS' FREE EXPRESSION RIGHTS AND SCHOOL DISCIPLINARY
AUTHORITY IN INTERNET-RELATED STUDENT SPEECH CASES
Without Supreme Court guidance, an innovative method of
implementing the principles of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District231 is required to strike the appropriate balance
between schools' interest in maintaining an ordered education environment
and students' interest in protecting their free expression rights. Although
Tinker was decided long before student Internet use was conceivable, its
principles are highly relevant in Internet speech cases. 232 Indeed, some
Internet-related speech cases and that, in some situations, regulating Internet speech is a matter of
parental discipline and not within the scope of school officials' authority); see also Hudson, supra note
9, at 22 (noting that Justin Layshock's mother punished Justin herself and believed that school
administrators acted harshly and failed to recognize her parental right to punish her son as she "saw
fit").
226 See supra note 189--196 and accompanying text (explaining how the majority of student
Internet expression with which school administrators take issue is posted at students' homes during
non-school hours); see also States Pushing for Laws to Curb Cyberbullying, supra note 18 (stating that
most cyberbullying "isn't going on at school... [i]t is going on at home").
227 See Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1051 (discussing the role of parents in "monitoring
the "material to which a child is exposed after he leaves school each afternoon"); see also States
Pushing for Laws to Curb Cyberbullying, supra note 18 (arguing that harmful Internet expression is not
just a school problem and the solution "has to start at home").
228 See e.g., Caplan, supra note 11, at 144 (stating that enforcing school rules for expression that
"occurs under a parent's roof' exceeds a school principal's jurisdiction); Cassel, supra note 6, at 668
(claiming that "a school should not have the authority to regulate what a student views or reads on [the
Internet] from her home computer .... The parents, not the schools, are responsible for monitoring and
disciplining this behavior.").
229 Grant, supra note 2 (discussing the roles and duties of parents and school administrators).
230 See discussion supra Part IV. C. (explaining the on-campus/off-campus distinction involved in
student Internet speech).
231 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
232 See Li, supra, note 45, at 103 ("[A]lthough the Tinker standard was formulated during the
Vietnam War era, it remains an appropriate standard today."); see also discussion supra note 190-91
and accompanying text (discussing the Tinker standard).
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Internet expression has come inside the "schoolhouse gate" 233 and this
expression has the same potential to impact the school environment, as did
the behavior at issue in Tinker. Moreover, Tinker ensures today's tech-
savvy students the same First Amendment protection against arbitrary
punishment that the students wearing black armbands received in 1969.234
A. Both Prongs of Tinker Must be Used in Deciding Internet-Related
Student Speech Cases
To evaluate the constitutionality of suspensions and expulsions based on
students' Internet speech, courts must consider both Tinker's "material and
substantial interference" and "invasion of the rights of others" prongs. 235
Courts have over-extended the "substantial disruption" standard to allow
schools to respond to modem concerns like Internet harassment and school
violence. 236 However, this ad hoc approach has left students vulnerable to
punishment for Internet expression that was merely "disagreeable" or
"offensive." 237 Tinker's "rights of others" prong" can provide the necessary
middle- ground and prevent courts from rendering the "substantial
disruption" prong meaningless.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the utility of Tinker's
"invasion of the rights of others" prong in Harper v. Poway Unified School
233 See Caplan, supra note 11, at 158 (noting that Internet technology has the ability to "penetrate
school walls"); see also Cassel, supra note 6, at 674 (stating that it is possible for student Internet
activity to cause a "valid on-campus concern").
234 See Caplan, supra note 11, at 154 (positing that "[e]ven with the vastly increased opportunity to
speak and be heard created by the Internet," students are entitled to the same First Amendment
protection today as they were in 1969, when Tinker was decided). See generally Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (explaining that "school officials cannot suppress
expressions of feelings with which they do not wish to contend.").
235 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (holding that in order for school officials to justify a restriction on
student expression, school officials must demonstrate that they had reason to anticipate that the conduct
would "materially and substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of
other students"). .....
236 See e.g., Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 36 (2d Cir.
2007) (finding that the punishment by school officials for an eighth grade student's IM icon depicting
his teacher being shot above the words "Kill Mr. VanderMolen" was justified because it was
"reasonably foreseeable that [the student]'s communication would cause a disruption within the school
environment"); J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 852-53 (Pa. 2002) (holding that the
school did not violate a student's First Amendment rights when it punished him for creating a web site
that made derogatory remarks about his algebra teacher). See generally Richards & Calvert, supra note
208, at 1140 (noting that "[the substantial and material disruption] standard... "is being abused by a
judiciary that perhaps is sucked in by fears of Columbine-like violence or that is pandering to school
administrators.").
237 See discussion supra Part IV. (analyzing the failure of the ad hoc approach employed by courts
in attempting to strike an appropriate balance between school authority and students' First Amendment
rights).
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District.238 The Harper court held that a school district could prohibit a
student from wearing t-shirts bearing anti-homosexual messages because
the shirts were "injurious to gay and lesbian students and interfered with
their right to learn." 239 The Ninth Circuit declared that "[p]ublic school
students who may be injured by verbal assaults on the basis of a core
identifying characteristic such as race, religion, or sexual orientation, have
a right to be free from such attacks while on school campuses." 240
Although the Ninth Circuit's desire to prevent substantial harm to
students' education was well-founded, its "minority status" limitation failed
to give adequate substance to Tinker's "rights of other students" standard.
Applying the Ninth Circuit's approach, a number of students who do not
qualify for "minority status" may be threatened or harassed by other
students, but will not be protected from disruptions in their learning
process. 241 Indeed, minority status does not determine whether expression
has collided with the rights of other students "to be secure and to be let
alone." 242 However, if, as this Note suggests, Tinker's "rights of others"
prong is used to focus on the effect of expression on other students'
education,243 it can adequately balance students' First Amendment rights
with schools' interest in protecting students from threatening and harassing
Internet expression. 244
238 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Tinker does contain an additional ground for banning student
speech, namely where it is an 'invasion of the rights of others."'). See generally Hudson, supra note 9,
at 20 (stating that the Ninth Circuit "breathed new life into" Tinker's "rights of others" standard in the
Harper decision).
239 See Harper, 445 F. 3d at 1180. In Harper, a school district permitted a student group called the
Gay-Straight Alliance to hold a "Day of Silence," which was intended to "teach tolerance of others,
particularly those of a different sexual orientation." Id. at 1171. On the 2004 "Day of Silence," a student
wore a t-shirt to school which read "I WILL NOT ACCEPT WHAT GOD HAS CONDEMNED," on
the front, and "HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL 'Romans 1:27' on the back. Id. On the following
day, the student wore a similar t-shirt to school, and the back of the second shirt retained the same
message as the first. Id. However, the front of the second shirt the back of which was the same as the
first shirt, but the front of which read "BE ASHAMED, OUR SCHOOL EMBRACED WHAT GOD
HAS CONDEMNED." Id. On both occasions, school officials requested that the student remove the
shirt because administrators found the shirts "inflammatory." and in violation of the school's dress
code. Id. The student refused and was required to remain in the school's front office for the duration of
both school days. 1d.
240 Id. at 1178.
241 Id. at 1200-01 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("[I]f '""interference with the learning process is the
keystone to the new right [announced by the Harper majority], how come it's limited to those
characteristics that are associated with minority status?").
242 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
243 See discussion infra Part VI.B.I- 2. (proposing a test for student Internet speech cases).
244 See Miller, supra note 38, at 646 (stating that "more precise definitions" are needed in order for
Tinker to "create a workable and understandable framework for dealing with student expression"). See
generally Anne Proffitt Dupre, Should Students Have Constitutional Rights? Keeping Order in the
Public Schools, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 49, 60 (1996) (explaining that "[t]he [Supreme) Court correctly
set up the problem-the need to reconcile the rights of the individual student that passed through the
schoolhouse gate with the tradition of affirming school power-but never solved it.").
2010] UNCERTAINTY A T THE "OUTER BOUNDARIES"
B. A Suggested Test for Internet-Related Student Speech Cases
Under the proposed analysis, courts should first consider the school's
proffered justification for punishing the Internet expression at issue. If the
school claims that the expression was threatening, it should be analyzed
under Tinker's "rights of others" prong. 245 Although a school should be
accorded some deference in this area, the court should perform an
independent contextual analysis.2 46 If the school claims that the expression
was harassment or had some type of serious emotive impact, it should also
be analyzed under Tinker's "rights of others" prong.247
All other types of expression should be analyzed under Tinker's
"material and substantial disruption" prong. For example, claims that
Internet expression caused or was likely to cause a disturbance in the
school would fall into this category. 248 Moreover, if the court finds that the
expression does not qualify as a threat or harassment under the "rights of
others" prong, the expression should be subjected to the "material and
substantial disruption" standard of Tinker. In this context, courts should
not relax the "substantial disruption" standard as they have in previous
Internet-related student speech cases. 249 Indeed, any arguments for
deference to the school will have been negated by the school's failure to
justify the punishment under the more lenient "rights of others"
245 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508 (declaring that students have the right to "be secure" at school and
students' wearing of black armbands in opposition to the Vietnam War did not cause "threats or acts of
violence on school premises"" to others present at the school); see also Harper v. Poway Unified Sch.
Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that the right to be secure involves "freedom from
physical attacks" and "students cannot hide behind the First Amendment to protect their 'right' to...
intimidate other students at school."). See generally Blystone, supra note 179, at 214 (arguing that
school administrators should respond to expression that impinges upon the rights of others in order to
ensure an "environment that is safe and conducive for learning").
246 See discussion supra Part IV. D. (discussing the importance of realizing children's behavior in
the context of these cases).
247 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508 (stating that the 'rights of others' standard includes the right "to be
let alone"); see also Harper, 445 F.3d at 1178 (explaining that "[b]eing secure involves not only the
freedom from physical assaults but from psychological attacks that cause young people to question their
self-worth and their rightful place in society.").
248 See e.g., Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 597 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (positing
that "[i]t is clear that school administrators need not wait until a 'substantial disruption' has already
occurred prior to taking action. Rather, school administrators may preempt problems if they have a
'specific and significant fear of disruption."'); Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 213-14 (D.
Conn. 2007) (noting that "schools are generally held to have the authority to censor on-campus speech
that school authorities consider to be vulgar, offensive, or otherwise contrary to the school's mission to
'inculcate the habits and manners of civility,' without the need to show a 'substantial disruption' under
Tinker.")
249 See supra note 228; see also notes 215-17 and accompanying text (suggesting that school
officials need to realize that they do not have unlimited authority over any student Interet-related
speech).
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standard., 250
a. The Rights of Other Students Prong - Threatening Internet Expression
Because of the "special characteristics of the school environment," 251 a
student's Internet expression need not rise to the level of a "true threat" to
justify school regulation. Rather, the court should determine whether it
was objectively reasonable to perceive the expression as threatening in
light of the "entire factual context." 252 This objective analysis must account
for the punished student's perspective, the school's perspective, and other
students' perspectives at the time the claimed threat occurred. 253
In evaluating the student's perspective, courts should consider whether
the student made the Internet expression in jest, where the speech was
posted, and the tone of the speech. 254 For example, it is more reasonable to
perceive a letter posted on the Internet that expressly manifests a desire to
harm a named student as "threatening" than it is to perceive parodies or
offensive cartoons as such.255 However, even posting commentary on a
web site may not be enough to justify punishment if other students clearly
understood the expression as an attempt at humor.256 Additionally, a court
should consider whether the school's actions were reasonably consistent
250 See Miller, supra note 38, at 652-53 (stating that Tinker gives schools the deference that they
require to maintain a "safe and educational environment," but at the same time looks out for students'
free expression interests because the material and substantial interference standard is a "heavy burden
[for schools] to carry"); see also Hudson, supra note 9, at 23 (noting that courts are "more deferential
when it comes to questions of safety and potential threats," but tend to be "very skeptical of school
actions based on opposition to the content of a student's expression").
251 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
252 Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining that "alleged
threats should be considered in light of their entire factual context, including the surrounding events and
the reaction of the listeners.") (internal quotation marks omitted). See J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist.,
757 A.2d 412, 428 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 2000) (Friedman, J., dissenting) (stating that in evaluating
threatening conduct a court must recognize the "particular circumstances presented by a specific case").
253 See discussion supra Part IV. D. (discussing the importance of realizing understanding modem
children's behavior in the context of these cases).
254 See, e.g., Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 786 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (finding that a
student's web page was not threatening where the student created the site "for laughs" and "never
meant anyone else to see it"). See generally Richards & Calvert, supra note 208, at 1107 (describing
humor and the manner of expression as important variables in determining whether student speech was
threatening).
255 Compare Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 626-27 (8th Cir. 2002)
(finding that an offensive and vulgar letter that a student had prepared at home was threatening where
the letter described how the student would rape, sodomize, and murder a named female classmate who
had previously broken up with him), with J.S., 807 A.2d at 859 (holding that a student's web site was
not threatening where the site poked fun at a teacher's physique, utilized cartoon characters, hand
drawings and song, and the web site, taken as a whole, was a "misguided attempt at humor or parody").
256 Compare Doe, 306 F.3d, at 625 (finding that a student's expression was threatening where most
students "would be frightened by [its] the message and tone" and "fear for their physical well-being"
upon seeing it), with J.S., 807 A.2d at 859 (holding that a student's web page was not threatening where
a teacher felt threatened, but most students understood the page as humor).
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with the perception of a threat. 257 Thus, a school should not have deference
to claim that student Internet expression was a threat when school officials
did not treat it as one.
After weighing all of these factors, if the court determines that the
Internet expression posed an objectively reasonable threat, the school
disciplinary action should be upheld under Tinker's "rights of others"
prong. However, if the court finds that it was not objectively reasonable to
perceive the expression as a threat, the school must prove that the
expression caused a "material and substantial disruption" of the school
environment in order to justify its discipline of the student.
b. The Rights of Others Prong - Harassment
If the student's Internet expression constituted "severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive" harassment 258 and interfered with another student's
"opportunity to learn," then punishment will be justified under Tinker's
"rights of others" prong.259 At a minimum, school officials must show that
the punishment was caused by something more than a "mere desire to
avoid discomfort and unpleasantness." 260 Moreover, proof of a single
instance of Internet harassment should not be enough to overcome a
257 See, J.S. v. Bethlehem Area. Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d 412, at 428-29 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 2000)
(Friedman, J., dissenting) (stating that "[i]f the School District here believed that any teacher,
administrator or student was endangered by Student's action, the School District clearly shirked its
responsibility by not suspending Student immediately [and] investigating the incident fully .... "); see
also Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting
that a school district promptly had a police investigator and a psychologist interview a student after the
district discovered the student's violent IM buddy icon).
258 Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650 (1999). Although Davis was decided
in the Title IX peer sexual harassment context, it drew a workable line between mere "teasing and
name-calling" among school children and behavior that has serious potential to create a "hostile
environment" that is disruptive to the victim's education. See id. at 652. Indeed, its focus on the effects
of the expression on the victim is ideal in giving Tinker's "rights of others" prong substance. It allows
the school leeway to protect students, but at the same time protects a student from arbitrary punishment
for engaging in childish banter. See generally Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 129 U.S.788, 793
(2009). This recent Supreme Court case recites the same standard expressed ten years earlier in Davis.
Id.
259 See Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the
First Amendment does not protect verbal assaults and intimidation that interferes with the victim's
"opportunity to learn"); see also Hudson, supra note 9, at 20-21 (arguing that Tinker's "rights of
others" standard gives school administrators authority over Internet speech that "cause[s] another
student so much emotional distress that it [interferes] with the student's ability to fully participate in
school").
260 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (indicating that
schools need the requisite justification to prohibit expression of even unpopular viewpoints). See
generally Miller, supra note 38, at 658 (noting that "[it is a basic First Amendment principle that [a
school] may not prohibit speech simply because someone in the audience may find the message
offensive.").
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student's First Amendment rights.2 61 Rather, the school carries a heavy
burden to demonstrate that the Internet harassment had a "systematic
effect," which carried over into the school environment.262
For example, punishment should be justified where a student's "harmful
and injurious" Instant Messenger attacks intimidate another student and
cause that recipient to avoid attending school or to suffer a decline in
grades.263 In contrast, merely posting a rumor or embarrassing photographs
of another student or faculty member on the Internet should not justify a
school official's punishment of a student.264 Moreover, the student's
willingness and promptness to remove the Internet expression in question
should weigh heavily in the student's favor.265
If the court finds that the student's Internet expression was not
punishable harassment under Tinker's "rights of others" prong, then the
school must prove that the expression caused a "material and substantial
disruption."
c. The Material and Substantial Disruption Prong - All Other Speech
If the school does not claim that the student's Internet expression was
threatening or constituted harassment, or if the school fails to justify its
punishment under the "rights of others" prong, then the school must prove
that the expression caused a "material and substantial disruption" in the
school environment. Here, the punishment should be subject to strict
261 See Davis, 526 U.S. at 652-53 (stating that a single instance of sexual harassment does not rise
to the level of "severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive"); see also Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508
(explaining that a few "hostile remarks" were not enough to overcome a student's First Amendment
rights).
262 See Davis, 526 U.S. at 652-53 (indicating that only behavior substantial enough to interrupt
one's equal access to education will suffice). See generally Hudson, supra note 9, at 21 (arguing that
the effects of pervasive cyberbullying can spill over into the school and, "[i]f students do not think that
school officials can help, they are going to suffer").
263 See Cf Harper, 445 F.3d at 1178-80 (stating that Tinker's rights of others standard protects
students from harassment that causes "academic underachievement, truancy, and dropout"); see also
Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 217 (3d Cir. 2001) (observing that, although "it is
certainly not enough that speech is merely offensive to some listener," speech that "substantially
interferes with a student's educational performance" may satisfy the Tinker standard).
264 See e.g., Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 600 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (finding
that a school principal's adverse reaction to a student's MySpace profile, which parodied the principal,
was not enough to justify punishment of the student under Tinker); Killion v. Franklin Reg'l Sch. Dist.,
136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (holding that school officials could not punish a student for
posting a rude and demeaning "Top 10" list about the school's athletic director on the Internet, even
though the list caused the athletic director to become "very upset.").
265 See, e.g.. Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1179 (E.D. Mo. 1998)
(stating that the punished student removed his website after the school principal asked him to do so);
J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 852 (Pa. 2002) (noting that the student in question
removed his website on his own approximately a week after school officials discovered the site absent
any urging by the school district).
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judicial scrutiny and courts should not relax the "substantial disruption"
prong, as some have in prior Internet-related student speech cases. 266 It will
not suffice for the school to claim that the Internet expression had "an
effect on the discipline or general welfare of the school."267 Moreover,
school officials' mere desire to hold a student accountable for offensive
expression does not justify punishment under the guise of a "material and
substantial disruption."26 8 Indeed, the First Amendment provides students
breathing space to express their opinions on "controversial subjects."2 69
Further, a school's "knee-jerk reaction" to Internet expression should
weigh heavily against the finding of a "material and substantial
disruption." 270 Courts must not permit school officials to stir up a "buzz" in
the school and then claim that a substantial disruption occurred. 27 1
266 See supra notes 175-76, 228-29 and accompanying text (recognizing the inconsistent
application of the Tinker standard when assessing students' freedom of speech within an educational
setting); See also K. Weng, Article, Type No Evil: The Proper Latitude of Public Educational
Institutions in Restricting Expressions of Their Students on the Internet, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J. 751, 757-58 (1998) (discussing a case where a student at the University of Michigan posted
internet excerpts of his sexual fantasies of masochistic and tortuous treatment of women which resulted
in the student's subsequent suspension from the University and arrest by the FBI because the student
"transmit[ed] threatening communications across state lines.").
267 See Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 784 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (reaffirming the Tinker
standard, which states that students' internet-based speech must "substantially inter[fere] with the work
of the school or impi[nge] upon the rights of other students."); see also Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at
599 (stating that "[s]chool officials [do not have] unfettered latitude to censor student speech under the
rubric of 'interference with the educational mission' because that term can be easily manipulated.").
268 See e.g., Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 208 (D. Conn. 2007) (explaining that while
a teacher found a student's internet journal posting offensive, the student's expression did not cause
wide a disruption within the school requiring punishment); Morse v. Frederick, 127 U.S. 2618, 2647-
48 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that courts must not defer to a principal's "ostensibly
reasonable judgment" because it would "permit a listener's perceptions to determine which speech
deserved constitutional protection.").
269 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969) (noting that a
school setting encourages students to openly proclaim their opinions and perspectives about
controversial or provoking social and political issues). But see Weng, supra note 265, at 755-56
(identifying four Cornell students who were charged with misuse of university resources and sexual
harassment after they used the university's computer system to widely distribute an e-mail titled "75
Reasons Why Women Should Not Have Freedom of Speech.").
270 See discussion supra Part V. (underscoring the restrictive aspects of students' intemet-based
speech and limited expressive freedom); see also Lisa Pisciotta, Beyond Sticks & Stones: A First
Amendment Framework for Educators Who Seek to Punish Student Threats, 30 SETON HALL L. REV.
635, 648-49 (2000) (explaining the balancing test courts must employ when determining whether
students' speech is constitutionally protected under the First Amendment or if the students' speech is
outside of the First Amendment's protection because it will likely upset the integrity of the educational
setting).
271 See Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 600-01 (W.D. Pa. 2007)
(distinguishing the administration's exaggerated reaction to the pupil's speech from the student body's
apathetic reaction to the same pupil's speech); see also Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F.
Supp. 2d 1175, 1177-78 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (identifying a teacher's outrage at a student's internet
homepage and the teacher's retaliatory decision to access the student's homepage, without the student's
permission, and reveal its contents to the school principal); Li, supra note 45, at 100 (declaring that "a
recipient's thin-skinned reaction to [student Internet] speech will not be an acceptable justification"
[for suppressing the expression]").
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Moreover, courts must recognize that not all Internet expression which
becomes a topic of discussion will amount to a "material and substantial
disruption." 272 Indeed, the notion that every childish message expressed on
the Internet would "actually persuade either the average student or even the
dumbest one to change his or her behavior is most implausible." 273
CONCLUSION
In the absence of United States Supreme Court guidance regarding
student Internet speech, an innovative way of implementing the principles
of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District must be
used to strike a balance between preserving school discipline and
protecting students' First Amendment rights. An epidemic of school
violence across the country has made it clear that school administrators
need the flexibility to preempt threats to the safety and well-being of their
students and employees. Moreover, non-threatening conduct that occurs in
the confines of one's home can have a negative effect on the school
environment and, in some limited circumstances, school officials should
have the power to respond to this type of conduct. However, clearly
delineated guidelines are needed to protect students' First Amendment
rights from arbitrary infringement. School administrators do not have
unfettered police power over students' Internet behavior. Most
importantly, it must be kept in mind that, at times, "kids will be kids," and
an unwarranted suspension or expulsion can severely damage a student's
education and morale.
272 See Tinker, 393 U.S. 503 at 510 (holding that an "urgent wish to avoid the controversy" that
might result from students demonstrating their opposition to the Vietnam War was not enough to
overcome the students' First Amendment rights); see also Leonard Niehoff, Civil Rights in the
Academy: The Student's Right to Freedom of Speech: How Much is Left at the Schoolhouse Gate?, 75
MICH. BAR J. 1150, 1150 (1996) (recognizing that the majority of conduct falls outside of the First
Amendment's protection because it lacks expressive content).
273 Morse, 127 U.S. at 2649 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[m]ost students... do not shed
their brains at the schoolhouse gate, and most students know dumb advocacy when they see it.");
McIntyre, supra note 218, at 44 (asserting that students are "not mere receptors of the States' [or
others'] message; their education encourages them to challenge, analyze, and test the message and to
express their own message.").
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